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ABSTRACT
The agency problem, the idea that corporate directors and officers
are motivated to prioritize their self-interest over the interest of their
corporation, has had a long-lasting impact on corporate-law theory
and practice. In recent years, however, as federal agencies have stepped
up enforcement efforts against corporations, a new problem has
surfaced: what we call the “reverse agency problem.” The surge in
criminal investigations against corporations, combined with the rising
popularity of settlement mechanisms, including pretrial diversion
agreements and corporate plea agreements, has led corporations to
sacrifice directors and officers in order to reach settlements with law
enforcement authorities as expeditiously as possible. This phenomenon
is the mirror image of the agency problem—the agent’s problem.
Although such settlements are in the best interests of companies and
shareholders, they can have devastating effects on individual directors
and officers. When they agree to settle a criminal prosecution, suspect
companies collectively attribute wrongdoing to a large group of
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directors and managers without distinguishing between the guilty and
the innocent. As a result, directors and officers implicated in settlements
often suffer severe reputational losses, regardless of their culpability.
Furthermore, the wrongdoing attributed to directors and officers in
settlements exposes them to derivative lawsuits for breaches of their
fiduciary duties. Unfortunately, extant law does not provide directors
and officers with a means to prove their innocence or clear their names.
In fact, it does not even give them a voice in the negotiations leading to
the drafting of settlements. Thus, it dooms many directors and officers
who have done no wrong to live with the mark of Cain and endure the
economic consequences thereof.
Four legal reforms could remedy the plight of nonculpable
individual officers and directors. The first seeks to amplify the voices
of individual corporate officers in settlement negotiations by giving
them the right to a hearing prior to the completion of a settlement. The
second gives directors and officers implicated in settlements the right to
bring an action for a declaration of innocence that would clear their
names and preempt derivative actions against them. The third solution
recognizes a horizontal fiduciary duty between directors and officers,
thereby allowing innocent directors and officers the right to sue their
guilty colleagues for breaching such duty. The fourth, which should
only become available in rare cases, is to let directors and officers sue
the corporation for which they worked for the harms they suffered as a
consequence of the corporation’s actions and admissions.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article unveils a new phenomenon that increasingly
permeates the corporate world. To date, corporate scholarship has
focused predominately on the agency problem, the ability of directors
and officers to shirk their duties and extract private benefits from
corporations with dispersed ownership. 1 We, however, present an
entirely new problem, originating in law enforcement initiatives
against corporations: what we call the “reverse agency problem.” This
phenomenon is the mirror image of the agency problem—the agent’s
problem.
The term “agency problem” as a general phenomenon was coined
by Professor Adolf Berle and economist Gardiner Means in their
seminal book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 2 The
concept has had an immediate and long-lasting effect on corporate-law
theory and practice. Indeed, no other scholarly contribution has had
such a significant impact on corporate law. The idea that directors and
officers are willing to sacrifice the interest of the corporation to
promote their narrow self-interest is both intuitive and correct. It is not
an exaggeration to say that since the book was published in 1932, the
agency problem has been the focal point of corporate-law theory.3
In recent years, however, the agency problem’s mirror image has
emerged: corporations are increasingly willing to sacrifice their
directors and officers4—namely, their agents—to further the corpor-

1. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119–23 (1932).
2. See id. (describing the “[d]ivergence of [i]nterest between [o]wnership and [c]ontrol” and
explaining that when corporations have dispersed ownership, “profits at the expense of the
corporation become practically clear gain to the persons in control and the interests of a profitseeking control run directly counter to the interests of the owners”).
3. Other significant articles that address the agency problem include: Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activists Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Zohar Goshen & Richard
Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
767 (2017); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
4. This Article focuses on the reverse agency problem’s consequences for directors and
officers because they are the primary targets of derivative actions. However, lower-level
employees of the company can also be harmed by the reverse agency problem. For an example of
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ations’ own interests.5 It is not an accident that this problem has gone
unnoticed given that it is a relatively new phenomenon that did not
exist in the past. Yet, it is significant and ubiquitous, and it is likely to
grow in the future.
The reverse agency problem is a by-product of the age of
compliance. Since the mid-2000s, publicly held companies have
increasingly been exposed to enforcement actions on the part of
various federal regulatory agencies, such as the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 6 State agencies, such as the New
York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”), have also
subjected them to criminal proceedings.7
Most of these investigations do not culminate in criminal charges.
Rather, they are settled outside of court in the form of “pretrial
diversion agreements” (“PDAs”),8 which include deferred prosecution
agreements (“DPAs”) and non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”).
Many other cases are settled postindictment through plea agreements.9

a lower-level manager alleging harm by the reverse agency problem, see Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet
Holdings, Inc., 940 F.3d 354, 357–58 (7th Cir. 2019).
5. There is family resemblance between the reverse agency problem and the problem of
principal cost that Professors Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire point out in a recent article. See
Goshen & Squire, supra note 3, at 770. Goshen and Squire’s theory focuses on the costs created
by shareholders, which they divide into “competence costs” and “conflict costs,” and they argue
that the law should minimize the sum of agency and principal costs. Id. at 770, 828 (emphasis
omitted). As this Article explains, the reverse agency problem is independent of the actions or
characteristics of shareholders. In fact, it is unrelated to the ownership structure. At its heart, it is
a problem that arises from the rational and legitimate actions of firms’ management and directors
in the face of enforcement actions.
6. See infra Part I.A (discussing federal enforcement).
7. As for the state agencies, see, for example, Courtney Dankworth, Eric Dinallo, Greg Lyons,
David Sewell & Brenna Rae Sooy, Debevoise & Plimpton Expects More New York Regulatory
Enforcement of Banking and Financial Services, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 10, 2020), https://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/09/10/debevoise-plimpton-expects-more-new-york-regulatoryenforcement-of-banking-and-financial-services [https://perma.cc/7BQN-CDSN] (“Similarly to the
Office of the Attorney General, DFS has increased enforcement action during the Trump
Administration.”).
8. See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through NonProsecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 334 n.32 (2017) (“In the entire period prior to issuance of the
Thompson Memo in January 2003, prosecutors negotiated only thirteen PDAs . . . . By contrast,
we find based on our dataset that they entered into at least 267 PDAs from 2004 through 2014
(excluding agreements involving antitrust, tax, and environmental violations).”); see also infra
Part I.B.1 (discussing the increased use of PDAs).
9. See infra Part I.B.3.
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This Article refers to these agreements collectively as “settlement
agreements.”
As a part of these agreements, corporate defendants must admit
to various counts of wrongdoing by their directors and managers.
These agents, many of whom are no longer employed by the relevant
companies at the time the agreement is consummated, typically have
little or no say in the process, yet will forever have to live with the
admissions that their corporations have made—admissions that
implicate them in wrongdoing. And although these admissions do not
formally bind them, they have a profound impact on their future. These
directors and managers suffer severe reputational losses, often
translating to lost careers and lost income, as a consequence of these
agreements.
Worse yet, corporations’ admissions invariably expose directors
and officers to follow-up civil suits against them.10 The admissions in
settlement agreements speak of various failures by the directors and
officers. They are drafted in strong language and thus serve as an
invitation to shareholders to demand that the corporation sue its
directors and officers for a breach of the duty of loyalty or a breach of
the duty of care. And if the corporation refuses to do so, these
shareholders themselves may initiate a derivative action against the
directors and officers.
Even though admissions made by a company do not formally bind
the agents and the agents can bring an independent action to have their
names cleared, they face an uphill climb. At that point, the company
has given up on them and sacrificed them on the altar of the
shareholders’ wellbeing. Surprisingly, for many years, law enforcement
authorities largely refrained from prosecuting individual directors and
officers, 11 focusing instead on the large payments they collect from
firms. In light of the financial crisis and following harsh criticisms of
this practice,12 law enforcement authorities in recent years have started

10. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Peter R. Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, Deferred Prosecution, and Making a Mockery
of the Criminal Justice System: U.S. Corporate DPAs Rejected on Many Fronts, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1113, 1135 & n.114 (2018) [hereinafter Reilly, Sweetheart Deals].
12. In an effort to respond to a significant criticism that the DOJ fails to prosecute individuals,
then-Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued a new policy in September 2015 in the form of a
memorandum entitled “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” or the “Yates
Memo.” See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to All
U.S. Att’ys et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
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initiating legal actions against individual employees, but only to a very
limited extent.13 In the small number of cases that resulted in charges
against individual employees, the employees did not have the financial
wherewithal or the psychological resources to continue the fight on
their own. By contrast, directors and officers have often mounted
successful defenses against such actions. 14 Yet even directors and
officers who are ultimately acquitted in court must still confront
prolonged legal battles on multiple fronts, as derivative actions may be
brought against them while they struggle to clear their names.
At this point, one may wonder: How can this be? There are two
pieces to the puzzle. The first is clear. Companies that face criminal
charges have an incentive to reach a settlement at all costs. To begin
with, once a criminal investigation is launched against them, companies
are at a high risk of criminal indictment and conviction if they choose
not to cooperate fully with the enforcement authority. History teaches
that indictment, not to mention conviction, has a dramatic negative
impact on companies.15 The accepted lore in the corporate-law world
is that “no major financial services firm has ever survived a criminal
indictment.”16
Furthermore, unlike individuals who are subject to a criminal
investigation, corporations that face criminal allegations have to bear
the full cost of the investigation. Although enforcement authorities do
not actively force suspect corporations to examine the allegations at
their own expense, they condition future settlement on full
cooperation, and they give corporations credit for carrying out the
investigation on their own and submitting their findings to the

Yates Memo], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/2AE9UE9Y].
13. See Paola C. Henry, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes After the Yates
Memo: Deferred Prosecution Agreements & Criminal Justice Reform, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153,
157–58, 160–61 (2016) (“After the release of the Yates Memo, the DOJ continued to use DPAs
in several cases where no individual employees were charged . . . . Thus, the government’s
continued use of DPAs without any individual accountability undermines the Yates Memo.”).
14. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
15. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1886 (2005)
(“The adverse publicity that accompanies a prosecution can devastate a corporation . . . .”); see
infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
16. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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authorities.17 As the DOJ’s Yates Memo stated: “[I]n order to qualify
for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the
Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for
the misconduct.” 18 The cost of conducting an internal investigation
typically runs in the tens of millions of dollars and can sometimes reach
hundreds of millions of dollars, which comes on top of standard
defense costs.19
To make matters worse, the uncertainty that comes with a criminal
investigation imposes an almost insurmountable drag on the
corporation and its ability to raise money. 20 It constitutes a serious
diversion of managerial resources, forcing the corporation to focus on
the criminal investigation instead of its core business activity.21 From
the vantage point of the company, dragging out the investigation is
tantamount to a death by a thousand cuts as the costs mount with every
day that passes.

17. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 9-28.700 (2018) [hereinafter Justice Manual], https://
www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.700
[https://perma.cc/P8VS-Q4KM] (“Cooperation is a mitigating factor, by which a corporation—
just like any other subject of a criminal investigation—can gain credit in a case that otherwise is
appropriate for indictment and prosecution.”).
18. Yates Memo, supra note 12, at 2.
19. As Samuel Rubenfeld describes,
The numbers, in some cases, are eye-popping. Wal Mart Stores Inc., which is still under
investigation, has spent $865 million since 2013, according to a review of its quarterly
disclosures; the company says it’s cooperating with U.S. authorities amid discussions of
a potential resolution. Avon Products Inc. spent about $350 million on investigationrelated costs before agreeing to pay U.S. authorities $135 million to settle its foreignbribery probe. Siemens AG reported spending more than $1 billion on legal costs
before its FCPA resolution in 2008.
Samuel Rubenfeld, Costly Corporate Investigations Have No Natural End-Point, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 10, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/costly-corporate-investigations-have-nonatural-end-point-1507630214 [https://perma.cc/BF7Z-GVNX]; see also Peter J. Henning, The
Mounting Costs of Internal Investigations, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 5, 2012, 11:07 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/the-mounting-costs-of-internal-investigations [https://
perma.cc/JTS7-G8Q6] (“When a corporation is caught in a government investigation, the legal
fees can quickly exceed $100 million . . . .”).
20. Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 509
(2015) (“Legal practitioners stated: ‘The reality is that few public or regulated companies can
withstand the uncertainties and consequences that flow from an unresolved federal criminal
indictment . . . .’” (quoting Scott A. Resnik & Keir N. Dougall, The Rise of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 18, 2006), https://dougallpc.com/pdf/The_Rise_of_Deferred_
Prosecution_Agreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3V5-W3SS])).
21. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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On top of that, a criminal investigation harms the company’s
reputation and makes it difficult for the corporation to do business
while the investigation is ongoing. Potential and actual business
partners become suspicious once they learn of the investigation and
demand constant clarifications and assurances from the suspect
company. This is especially true for financial institutions that
inherently rely on business ties with correspondent banks.22 Naturally,
if the clarifications and assurances are not satisfactory, valuable
business relationships will be lost. Hence, corporations will readily
admit to wrongdoing by their agents to put an end to the investigation
and hopefully sweeten the bitter pill with a reduced fine.23
The second piece of the puzzle is less obvious. It concentrates on
the question of how it is possible that companies are guilty of breaking
the law—and to be clear, they are—while their agents may be innocent.
To start, the requirements for imposing criminal liability on
corporations are much lower than those necessary for imposing
criminal liability on individuals. 24 In the case of corporations, the
elements of an offense, both the actus reus and the mens rea, can be
satisfied by the conduct and mental states of different executives and
employees, aggregated and imputed to the firm. In contrast, to impose
personal liability, all elements must be satisfied by the same individual.
Hence, it is often impossible to derive the guilt of any particular
individual agent from a corporation’s admissions.25 At the same time,
the relative ease of finding corporations criminally liable constitutes
additional inducement for them to settle with law enforcement
agencies, even when it requires admitting to wrongdoing by their
agents.
Firms’ desire to enter settlements with law enforcement is
perfectly rational. Moreover, they are obligated to do so by law.
Presiding directors and officers, who are required to decide whether to
enter into a settlement with the enforcement authority, owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation, not to their predecessors. Again, closing
criminal investigations and receiving credit for cooperating with law
enforcement authorities are in the best interest of the firm. Hence, by
22. Greenblum, supra note 15, at 1886 (“The adverse publicity that accompanies a
prosecution can devastate a corporation, particularly one that relies heavily on its reputation in
the marketplace, because of the effect on relationships with customers, creditors, and the public
at large.”).
23. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
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requiring directors and officers to put the firm’s interests above all
other considerations, the law exacerbates the plight of past directors
and officers.
This Article proposes four mechanisms to address the harsh
consequences of the reverse agency problem and alleviate the plight of
innocent directors and officers. The first mechanism amplifies the
voices of individual corporate officers in settlement negotiations by
giving them a right to a hearing prior to the finalization of a settlement.
This would enable individual directors and officers to review
settlements and propose changes before they are signed. Second,
individual directors and officers implicated in settlements should have
the right to bring an action for a declaration of innocence that could
clear them of liability. This would grant innocent directors and officers
the power to initiate legal actions to dispel the suspicions surrounding
them and preempt derivative actions against them. The third proposal
is to allow innocent directors and officers the right to sue their
colleagues who went astray and precipitated a cascade of harms on the
corporation and its directors and officers. The fourth, and arguably
most extreme, way to address the problem is to allow directors and
corporate officers to bring suits against the corporation for which they
worked to redress the harm they suffered as a consequence of actions
and admissions made by the corporation in the course of the criminal
investigation against it. Because it is drastic, this option should be
reserved for cases involving recklessness or gross negligence in
harming former board members and managers.
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I discusses the rise in
enforcement actions against corporations and the resulting PDAs, and
explains how they drive a wedge between the interests of the
corporation and its directors and officers, mainly former directors and
officers. Part II introduces the reverse agency problem and positions it
within the rich conceptual framework of principal–agent conflicts
developed by corporate-law theorists. Part III advances proposed
solutions to the reverse agency problem.
I. THE COMPLIANCE AGE
The backdrop and driving force behind the reverse agency
problem is a dramatic increase in the rate and intensity of criminal
enforcement actions against corporations. Criminal actions against
corporations have existed for a long time. In the last two decades,
however, law enforcement authorities have stepped up their
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enforcement efforts against corporations, taking them to
unprecedented levels. In particular, enforcement efforts intensified in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the government bailout of
the financial sector.26
An important corollary of this trend is the emergence of vast
settlements, running in the hundreds of millions of dollars, that are
struck between corporations and law enforcement agencies. The
money from these settlements has gone into the public fisc and has
been used, in part, to continue the enforcement campaign. This Part
discusses the increase in enforcement actions against corporations and
explains how they have transformed the corporate landscape.
A. The Rise of Enforcement Actions
Recent years have witnessed a sea change in enforcement actions
against corporations. The DOJ, SEC, and IRS have invested
considerable efforts and resources in criminal investigations against
companies. This trend has grown in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis, with some commentators speculating that criminal enforcement
against corporations provides a cost-effective method to bring money
into the public fisc, and thereby defray, at least to some extent, the cost
of the bailout.27

26. Official statements show there was an increase in enforcement efforts following the
financial crisis. See, e.g., Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks on Financial Fraud
Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law [https://perma.cc/
3FXT-QEYK] (“Our record demonstrates that when the evidence and the law support it, we do
not hesitate to bring charges against anyone. Between 2009 and 2013, the Justice Department
charged more white-collar defendants than during any previous five-year period going back to at
least 1994.”). However, some studies cast doubt on the accuracy of such statements. See, e.g.,
Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of Corporations,
TRAC REPS. (Oct. 13, 2015), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406 [https://perma.cc/7T7SQSR5] (suggesting “the decline in corporate prosecutions” cannot be fully explained by the
increase in the use of DPAs and may “reflect a general decline in federal prosecution efforts”). It
is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate which side is correct because doing so requires an
examination of the cases declined by federal prosecutors and “[w]e simply do not have good data
on such cases.” BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS 254 (2014).
27. See, e.g., Benjamin Bathke, Financial Crisis Bank Fines Hit Record 10 Years After Market
Collapse, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/financial-crisis-bank-fineshit-record-10-years-after-market-collapse/a-40044540 [https://perma.cc/EJQ3-RP6F] (“In fact,
the US has not only gotten back every dime it used to rescue banks, it has recovered more than
the total cumulative impact of the bailout.”); see also FT Podcast, Credit Crisis Fines Hit $150
Billion, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d5a2cca3-803f-4866-8083-
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The tidal wave of enforcement actions—centered on violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), False Claims Act
(“FCA”), and Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”)28—has exposed companies
to an unprecedented level of liability and risk. This Section discusses
these changes in detail, beginning with the FCPA.
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 to combat the spread of
corruption in international business transactions. 29 Until 1998, the
FCPA had very little effect on the ground—investigations and
prosecutions were rare. 30 Everything changed in 2005 when FCPA
enforcement began in earnest.31 Nearly 70 percent of DOJ and SEC
cases involving the FCPA were commenced between 2005–2013.32 This
renewed focus on FCPA enforcement has led companies to voluntarily
pay heavy penalties to settle actions against them.
The harbinger of things to come was the Siemens AG case. In
2008, Siemens AG signed a plea agreement with the DOJ’s criminal

fa972c9d9076 [https://perma.cc/HT4N-44ZF] (“Financial institutions have paid more than $150bn
in fines in the US relating to the credit crisis a decade ago.”).
28. The DOJ also increasingly enforces laws and regulations aimed at preventing moneylaundering, environmental, and antitrust violations.
29. The text of the FCPA declares its purpose is
to make it unlawful for an issuer of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of [the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934] or an issuer required to file reports pursuant to
section 15(d) of such Act to make certain payments to foreign officials and other
foreign persons, to require such issuers to maintain accurate records, and for other
purposes.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494.
30. For historical background of FCPA enforcement until the 2000s, see, for example,
Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corruption Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is
Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1093–1108 (2012) (“[T]he SEC began to
enforce the FCPA in earnest in the early 2000s.”) and Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate
Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1829 (2011) (“While for decades FCPA prosecutions were
rare, they accelerated after 1998.”).
31. See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2012) (describing
increased FCPA enforcement beginning in 2007); Roger M. Witten, Kimberly A. Parker, Jay
Holtmeier & Thomas J. Koffer, Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and
Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691 (2009) (noting that 2006–2008 saw more FCPA
actions than the entirety of 1977–2005, and describing the impact of increased FCPA enforcement
in the pharmaceutical industry). See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under
the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1247 (2008) (noting an increase
in FCPA actions and penalties from 2005–2007).
32. GERALD S. MARTIN, JONATHAN M. KARPOFF & D. SCOTT LEE, SEARLE CIV. JUST.
INST., LAW & ECON. CTR, GEORGE MASON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: ECONOMIC IMPACT ON TARGETED FIRMS 1 (2014).

PARCHOMOVSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1520

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/25/2021 8:18 PM

[Vol. 70:1509

division, as part of which it agreed to pay $800 million to settle
allegations of FCPA violations in multiple countries. 33 As then-SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox put it at that time, it was “the largest
settlement in the history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act since it
became law in 1977.”34
A year later, in 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) paid $579
million to the DOJ and SEC to resolve a broad investigation of FCPA
violations via a plea agreement.35 The penalties have only continued to
increase. For example, in 2017, Telia Company AB, a Swedish phone
company, agreed to pay $965.8 million to settle, via DPA, U.S. and
European criminal and civil charges that it paid bribes to win business
in Uzbekistan. 36 Then, in 2018, Petrobras, Brazil’s state energy
company, entered into an NPA with the DOJ that included a criminal
penalty of $853.2 million,37 in addition to a related settlement with the
SEC. And in 2020, Goldman Sachs agreed to pay $3.3 billion to the
DOJ and SEC to resolve an FCPA case against it.38

33. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree To Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal
Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html
[https://perma.cc/QC7B-VR9E].
34. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm [https://
perma.cc/5WP9-4DJK].
35. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign
Bribery Charges and Agrees To Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kellogg-brown-root-llc-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-charges-and-agreespay-402-million [https://perma.cc/CZ32-V3PH]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2009/2009-23.htm [https://perma.cc/K5DX-L688]. To gain an idea of the scope of DOJ and SEC
investigations into FCPA cases, see GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, 2007 YEAR-END FCPA
UPDATE (2008) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN-2007], https://www.gibsondunn.com/2007-year-endfcpa-update [https://perma.cc/Y9FE-BU8S] (listing dozens of FCPA investigations in 2007 alone).
36. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Telia Company AB and Its Uzbek Subsidiary Enter into
a Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of More than $965 Million for Corrupt Payments in Uzbekistan
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-ab-and-its-uzbek-subsidiary-enterglobal-foreign-bribery-resolution-more-965 [https://perma.cc/43EJ-NQJJ]. The FCPA Top Ten List
is available at the FCPA Blog. Harry Cassin, Wall Street Bank Earns Top Spot on FCPA Blog Top
Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 26, 2020, 7:58 AM), https://fcpablog.com/2020/10/26/wall-street-bankearns-top-spot-on-fcpa-blog-top-ten-list [https://perma.cc/S6CN-99XL].
37. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras Agrees To Pay More
than $850 Million for FCPA Violations (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/petr-leobrasileiro-sa-petrobras-agrees-pay-more-850-million-fcpa-violations [https://perma.cc/ZG3Z-VHAV].
38. See Cassin, supra note 36 (summarizing the Goldman Sachs settlement).
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These enforcement actions have been heralded in public
pronouncements by DOJ officials. For example, in 2007, Mark F.
Mendelsohn, deputy chief of the fraud section of the DOJ Criminal
Division, stated in his opening address at the American Conference
Institute’s FCPA Conference that “2007 is by any measure a landmark
year in the fight against foreign bribery.”39 Speaking a year later at an
American Bar Association panel on foreign bribery, he promised that
the trend would continue. 40 Mendelsohn’s promise was echoed by
Lanny Breuer, the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, who made it
clear in November 2010 that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s
ever been—and getting stronger.”41
These were not empty promises. In 2008, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation created a unit dedicated to FCPA investigations;42 and in
2010, the SEC also formed a specialized unit within its enforcement
division to focus on these cases.43 Finally, in November 2017, the DOJ
published a new FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy intended to
encourage companies to voluntarily disclose misconduct and cooperate
with enforcement authorities.44 Figure 1 illustrates the rise in FCPA
enforcement actions brought by the DOJ and the SEC between 1978
and 2019:

39. GIBSON DUNN-2007, supra note 35 (describing that Frederic D. Firestone, an associate
director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, followed Mendelsohn’s words by saying “ditto
from the SEC”).
40. Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, CORP. CRIME REP. (Sept.
16, 2008), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohn091608.htm [https://perma.cc/R8MSY3U6].
41. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the 24th National
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-24th-national-conference-foreign-corrupt
[https://perma.cc/3TWJ-NAN3] (“[W]e are in a new era of FCPA enforcement; and we are here to
stay.”).
42. See Public Corruption, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/public-corruption [https://
perma.cc/75ZA-PBMF].
43. Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director, Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote
Address at the International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch111913ac [https://perma.cc/5TVT-BBVQ].
44. Justice Manual, supra note 17, § 9-47.120. The new policy was first published in
November 2017. See David A. Silva, Department of Justice Adopts New FCPA Corporate
Enforcement Policy, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/committees/professional-liability/practice/2017/department-of-justice-adopts-newfcpa-corporate-enforcement-policy [https://perma.cc/B3EM-L47G].
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FIGURE 1: COMBINED DOJ/SEC FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, 1978–201945
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A similar dynamic can be traced in FCA46 enforcement, as it has
recently become a major weapon in the arsenal of enforcement
authorities. 47 The Act prohibits any person or organization from
defrauding the government on the material terms of its receipt of
government money or certification. FCA enforcement actions received
45. GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2019 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 2 (2020), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2019-year-end-fcpa-update.pdf [https://perma.
cc/CFC5-A3JK]. For the data regarding the years 1979–2018, see Michael S. Diamant, Christopher
W.H. Sullivan & Jason H. Smith, FCPA Enforcement Against U.S. and Non-U.S. Companies, 8
MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 353, 357 (2019).
46. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018).
47. As Benjamin Mizer, the head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division announced in
December 2016, “Congress amended the False Claims Act 30 years ago to give the government a
more effective tool against false and fraudulent claims against federal programs . . . . An
astonishing 60 percent of those recoveries were obtained in the last eight years.” Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases
in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recoversover-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/CH3V-AB4K].
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public attention when, in 2009, the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer agreed
to pay $2.3 billion to settle FCA civil and criminal allegations after
being accused of promoting the sale of certain drugs that the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) refused to approve due to safety
concerns. 48 In emphasizing the magnitude of the penalties FCA
infringers should expect to face, Assistant Attorney General Tony
West said, “This civil settlement and plea agreement by Pfizer
represent yet another example of what penalties will be faced when a
pharmaceutical company puts profits ahead of patient welfare.”49 FCA
civil and criminal investigations into the promotion of non-FDAapproved drug uses have continued, as have the large settlements to
resolve them. For example, global pharma company Eli Lilly paid $1.4
billion in 2009,50 Abbott Laboratories paid $1.5 billion in 2012,51 and
Johnson & Johnson agreed in 2013 to pay $2.2 billion to settle similar
FCA allegations.52 The rise in FCA enforcement actions continues. In
2017 alone, the DOJ recovered over $3.7 billion from FCA-related
investigations,53 and 2018’s aggregate recovery was over $2.8 billion.54
This trend is not likely to wane in the foreseeable future.

48. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Announces Largest Health
Care Fraud Settlement in Its History: Pfizer To Pay $2.3 Billion for Fraudulent Marketing (Sept.
2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-largest-health-care-fraudsettlement-its-history [https://perma.cc/H5VG-8LGN].
49. Id.
50. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Eli Lilly Company Agrees To Pay $1.415 Billion To
Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html [https://perma.cc/W3C7-H2P2].
51. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Abbott Labs To Pay $1.5 Billion To Resolve
Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-Label Promotion of Depakote (May 7, 2012), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay-15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-investigations-labelpromotion-depakote [https://perma.cc/V5QM-TWBQ].
52. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Johnson & Johnson To Pay More than $2.2 Billion
To Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/
3QHE-QUJY].
53. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://
perma.cc/878K-WEHX].
54. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://
perma.cc/VPN7-Y7DG].
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Laws designed to prevent money laundering have also provided a
launching pad for enforcement actions. In this context, U.S. regulators
have increased their efforts to ensure financial institutions comply with
the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign
Transaction Act of 197055 (commonly referred to as the BSA) and antimoney laundering (“AML”) laws. This campaign is led by the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”)—the Treasury’s leading
agency for combatting money laundering. The SEC and the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority have also indicated their intent to focus
their resources on AML violations. 56 Naturally, these authorities
primarily target banks and depository institutions. And enforcement
actions so far have quickly resulted in large settlements. In December
2012, HSBC Holdings admitted to AML violations and resolved them
by agreeing to pay $1.2 billion as part of a DPA with the DOJ. 57
Additionally, it agreed to pay $665 million in civil penalties to the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve.58
In February 2018, U.S. Bancorp (“USB”) and the Office of the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York entered into a
DPA to resolve criminal charges against the company.59 Those charges
consisted of two alleged BSA violations by USB’s subsidiary, U.S.
Bank National Association, for willfully failing to maintain an
adequate AML program and willfully failing to file a Suspicious

55. Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transaction Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118.
56. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS,
EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2017, at 4 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/nationalexamination-program-priorities-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV85-UFSN] (“Money laundering and
terrorist financing continue to be risk areas that are considered in our examination program.”);
FINRA, 2017 ANNUAL REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER 8 (2017), http://
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017-regulatory-and-examination-priorities-letter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NK3G-GFBC] (“In 2017, FINRA will continue to focus on firms’ anti-money laundering
programs, especially those areas where we have observed shortcomings.”).
57. HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and
Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admitanti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/VU3S-RSLX].
58. Id.
59. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-cr-150
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Criminal Charges Against U.S. Bancorp for Violations of the Bank Secrecy Act
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announcescriminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-violations-bank [https://perma.cc/ZZL7-F2SN].
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Activity Report. The DPA specified that USB would pay the United
States $528 million.
Between January 2002 and December 2015, 76.3 percent of AML
and BSA enforcement cases were directed at banks and depository
institutions.60 In the years since the financial crisis of 2008, the world’s
biggest banks have been fined $321 billion.61
It certainly appears as if AML and BSA enforcement will remain
at the forefront of U.S. legislative and regulatory priorities in coming
years. Recently, Congress has shown an interest in updating AML laws
by proposing multiple new bills 62 and engaging in a number of
discussions on the subject.63 The next Section further explains how and
why many enforcement actions end with PDAs.
B. Pretrial Diversion Agreements
1. The Growth in the Use of PDAs. As explained above, the
number of corporate criminal investigations has increased
exponentially over the last two decades. As Professors Jennifer Arlen
and Marcel Kahan note, “corporate criminal enforcement in the
United States has undergone a dramatic transformation,”64 and these
enhanced enforcement efforts have brought about a corresponding
increase in the number of PDAs.65 A related explanation for this trend
focuses on the Thompson Memo released by the DOJ in 2003, which
60. SHARON BROWN-HRUSKA, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, DEVELOPMENTS IN BANK
SECRECY ACT AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION 4 (2016),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/PUB_Developments_BSA_AML_
Lit-06.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG22-MJH3].
61. Gavin Finch, World’s Biggest Banks Fined $321 Billion Since Financial Crisis,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/world-sbiggest-banks-fined-321-billion-since-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/6TL9-5BCU].
62. See, e.g., AML and CTF Modernization Act, H.R. 4373, 115th Cong. (2017); Combating
Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017, S. 1241, 115th Cong.
(2017).
63. See, e.g., Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance: Opportunities
to Reform and Strengthen BSA Enforcement: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urb. Affs., 115th Cong. 1 (Jan. 9, 2018) (statement of Sen. Mike Crapo, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs.).
64. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 8, at 324.
65. Recall that PDAs include both non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred
prosecution agreements (“DPAs”). The main difference between them is that whereas a DPA
involves the filing of charges in federal court, an NPA does not. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark
A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on NonProsecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2015).
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instructed federal prosecutors to defer prosecution if corporations
agreed to cooperate fully with investigations led by the DOJ or its
agents, “including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client
and work product protection.”66 Figure 2 illustrates the growing use of
PDAs over the last decade:
FIGURE 2: CORPORATE NPAS AND DPAS, 2000–201967
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66. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
Heads of Dep’t Components U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003); see also infra notes 138–39.
67. See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2019 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 2 (2020), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/2019-year-end-npa-dpa-update [https://perma.cc/7EHD-K9K6]; see also
Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 434–35 (2012) (“In the twentyfirst century the use of DPAs ‘has evolved rapidly to the point that they are now the primary tool
in DOJ’s efforts to combat corporate crime.’”). This trend is not unique to the United States. See
Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, supra note 11, at 1140 (describing the growing use of PDAs in other
countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom); see also Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K.
To Move Forward with Deferred-Prosecution Agreements, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CCB-7259 [https://perma.cc/QQY4-3YFR] (“The U.K. intends
moving forward with introducing deferred-prosecution agreements, a law enforcement tool
extensively used by the U.S., to prosecute white-collar crime, according to a consultation paper.”).
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Instead of prosecuting cases to a final judgment, enforcement
authorities have displayed a preference to enter into PDAs with public
companies.68 Under these pretrial agreements, corporations agree to
admit to wrongdoing, pay considerable amounts—sometimes
hundreds of millions of dollars 69 —and undertake various corrective
measures to prevent future lapses in compliance. In exchange, the
enforcement authority will defer the prosecution for a certain period
of time. If the corporation has performed the agreement at the end of
that period, the prosecution will be dropped.70
The company under investigation and the enforcement authority,
typically the DOJ, usually enter into the agreement following an
internal investigation. The company itself leads the investigation with
the assistance of a DOJ-approved audit firm,71 which makes a forensic
examination to validate the data obtained from the company’s sources.
In some cases, the DOJ forces the company to nominate an external
monitor to supervise the collection and analysis of the data. The
investigative process includes the collection and review of thousands of
documents and emails. In some cases, the numbers are much higher,

68. Lanny A. Breuer, former head of the DOJ Criminal Division, stated that DPAs had
“become a mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement.” Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the New York
City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-bar-association [https://perma.cc/CFP6-QBU8]; see
also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007)
[hereinafter Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution] (“[T]he Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
adopted a novel strategy by prosecuting large organizations far more often, but leveraging the
prosecutions to secure adoption of sweeping internal reforms. Without obtaining an indictment,
much less a conviction, the DOJ recently prevailed on thirty-five leading corporations
. . . .”); Koehler, supra note 20, at 515–22 (describing the dominant use of DPAs and NPAs in
FCPA enforcement); Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of
Corporations” Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the
Purposes of the Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2014) (“The biggest
change in corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years has been the plunge in criminal
convictions of large organizations, and the DOJ’s consistent use of [deferred prosecution]
agreements to dispose of criminal wrongdoing.”).
69. See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2018 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 1 (2019), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2018-year-end-npa-dpa-update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9JAC-Q2HN] (showing how in 2018, in the United States, “the monetary recoveries
skyrocketed to nearly $8.1 billion”).
70. See Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 878 (2009).
71. Typically, the audit company will be one of the “big four,” namely, Deloitte, Ernst &
Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
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and millions of pages of documents are produced and submitted to the
DOJ. Within this process, the company must collect and translate
multiple documents, conduct internal interviews, and make
representations to the DOJ reflecting the result of the internal
investigation. After completing the negotiation, a PDA will be signed.
PDAs characteristically impose burdensome requirements on
companies, including the establishment of a sophisticated and
comprehensive compliance program; 72 high-level personnel changes,
such as termination of high-, mid-, and low-level officers; 73 business
changes; 74 and the appointment of an external corporate monitor
approved by the enforcement authority for the probation period, which
is usually twenty-four to thirty-six months.75
Also, PDAs include a statement of facts in which the company
admits to the offenses of which it is accused in a very detailed manner.76
Professor Richard Epstein went so far as to describe these admissions

72. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 8, at 342 (“[F]rom 2008 to 2014, approximately 82 percent
of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ Criminal Division or the US Attorneys’ Offices imposed
compliance program mandates . . . .”).
73. See Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 84, 92–94
(2014) (finding that out of 271 PDAs executed between 1993–2013, 30 percent mandated changes
in senior management).
74. See id. at 84, 94 (finding that out of 271 PDAs executed between 1993–2013, 30 percent
mandated business changes).
75. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 8, at 342 (“[F]rom 2008 to 2014 . . . more than 30 percent
[of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ Criminal Division or the US Attorneys’ Offices] imposed
outside monitors . . . .”); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 68, at 898 (“The
length of monitoring is often longer than the typical eighteen months for deferral agreements and
can be as long as three years. The average amount of time that these agreements last is two years.
A few specify that they can be extended if needed to secure compliance.”); see also Alexander &
Cohen, supra note 65, at 588 (“[S]ome commentators regard DPAs and NPAs as being more
likely to require far reaching governance reforms, including external monitors and compliance
programs, than those typically achieved through a plea agreement.”); Court E. Golumbic &
Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big To Jail” Effect and the Impact on the Justice Department’s
Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1311–12, 1320 (2014) (explaining that “DPAs
generally include undertakings to make significant structural and procedural reforms,” and
highlighting the “expansive” “corporate governance measures HSBC agreed to undertake” as
part of a settlement with the Justice Department); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L.
Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1720–26
(2007) (reviewing “twenty-five cases in which DPAs or NPAs required the appointment of
someone with ongoing supervisory responsibility” to evaluate monitors and their powers). See
generally Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014)
(analyzing corporate compliance monitors).
76. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 8, at 334.
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as “confessions of a Stalinist purge trial.”77 The company must state
that the facts set forth in the statement of facts are “true” and
“accurate” and agree that it shall not, through its attorneys, employees,
or other agents, make any public statement, in litigation or otherwise,
contradicting the statement of facts, as long as they speak on behalf of
the company.78
The consequences for the directors and officers implicated in the
investigation are far-reaching and dire. Naturally, the company’s
admissions affect them. True, the admissions of the company do not
formally bind the directors and officers, but the attribution of wrongful
actions and omissions to corporate officers have profound implications
for their careers. Current directors and officers can affect to some
degree the admissions made by the corporation about their acts or
omissions, thus lessening their impact. If, however, the investigation
concentrates on the actions and omissions of past directors and officers,
they have absolutely no influence on the admissions made by the
company. They are not directly involved in the negotiations leading to
the PDA and have no say in the process. Part III.A discusses the
ramifications of this reality for corporate law and theory.
2. The Pressure To Settle. At this point, readers may wonder why
powerful corporations sign PDAs. PDAs are essentially plea
bargains.79 A voluminous literature explains why individuals enter plea
bargains.80 Most individual defendants simply do not have the financial
resources to fight the charges facing them. Corporations, especially
public ones, clearly do not have this problem. So why sign? Although
in the typical case corporations have superior financial resources to
individuals, that does not mean they can afford a prolonged legal battle

77. Professor Richard Epstein argues further that
[t]he agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered
corporations recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of any
underlying offense . . . . [Their use] erodes the most elementary protections of the
criminal law, by turning the prosecutor into judge and jury, thus undermining our
principles of separation of powers.
Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2006, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468395737834160 [https://perma.cc/VH6T-965L].
78. See Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 924–25
(2008).
79. For a detailed discussion of the differences between PDAs and plea agreements, see infra
Part II.B.3.
80. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty [https://perma.
cc/24NJ-87JB].

PARCHOMOVSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1530

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/25/2021 8:18 PM

[Vol. 70:1509

against the state or that it is in their best interest to do so. As this
Section explains, corporations, too, have a very strong incentive to
settle. It is no accident that a considerable number of criminal
investigations against corporations end in an agreement.
Corporations enter PDAs for a number of legal and economic
reasons. To begin with the legal reasons, imposing criminal liability on
a corporation is easier than successfully prosecuting individuals.
Unlike in cases against individuals, where the prosecutor must prove
that one individual performed all the elements of the offense, the acts
and omissions of different corporate agents may be used together to
prove the case against corporations. As a consequence, a corporation
can be charged with a criminal offense even if none of its directors,
officers, or employees individually can be accused of it.
Two doctrines create this result. First and foremost, when the DOJ
chooses to charge a company with a violation of a federal statute, it
largely relies on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this
doctrine, the company may be found liable for acts of its employees if
they were acting within the scope of their authority and were
motivated, at least in part, by the desire to benefit the corporation.81
Courts have construed this doctrine broadly. First, the respondeat
superior doctrine enables the imposition of liability on the company,
regardless of the position of the employee who violated the law. 82
Second, a company may be held liable “even if an employee is violating
express corporate policy.”83 Third, the requirement that the employee
acted within the scope of her authority has been “defined to mean ‘in
the corporation’s behalf in performance of the agent’s general line of
work,’ including ‘not only that which has been authorized by the

81. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909);
United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 249–51 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d
550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
82. See Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating
a “corporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, employees”);
see also United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting the
argument “that corporate criminal liability can only stem from the actions of so-called
‘managerial’ employees” as “at odds with . . . precedents” (citations omitted)); United States v.
Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975) (“The cases recognize that corporations are
responsible for the acts and omissions of their authorized agents acting in the scope of their
employment. There is no doubt as to the authority of the superintendent, the foreman and the
back hoe operator.” (citations omitted)).
83. City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1992).
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corporation, but also that which outsiders could reasonably assume the
agent would have authority to do.’”84 Fourth, when examining whether
the employee acted with the intent to benefit the company, it is the
intent that matters, rather than the actual benefit to the company.85
Interestingly, it is no defense that the employee acted primarily for his
personal benefit, 86 but it may be one when the employee acted
exclusively for his own benefit.87
The second doctrine that the DOJ may use is the collectiveknowledge doctrine. This doctrine makes it possible to impose criminal
liability on corporations, even in cases where no individual has
committed all the components of the offense.88 Under this doctrine, the
knowledge and conduct of multiple employees can be imputed, in
aggregation, to the company.89 In this way, courts can impose criminal
liability on the company even if no individual employee had the mens
rea necessary to prove the offense.90 Taken together, the respondeat
superior doctrine and the collective-knowledge doctrine make
companies much more vulnerable to criminal convictions, compared to
individuals.91
84. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972); see United
States v. Automated Medic. Lab’ys, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
85. See Automated Medic. Lab’ys, Inc., 770 F.2d at 407.
86. See Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d at 970–71.
87. See Automated Medic. Lab’ys, Inc., 770 F.2d at 407; Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 307 F.2d at
129.
88. The First Circuit explains:
a corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by
several employees was not acquired by any one individual who then would have
comprehended its full import. Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired
the collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act
accordingly.
United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United States
v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974)).
89. This doctrine arises because
[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant
whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific
activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation.
Id.
90. Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 114–15 (explaining generally the collective-knowledge doctrine and its
relation to mens rea).
91. A note argues that
proving that a corporate defendant committed the illegal act is in practice substantially
easier than an individual prosecution. Courts have also found the requirement of

PARCHOMOVSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1532

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/25/2021 8:18 PM

[Vol. 70:1509

The business reasons to sign a PDA are even weightier. Once the
company is accused of violating the law—and whether or not it is
ultimately convicted— it must invariably expend valuable resources on
the investigation and incur significant losses. The expenses accumulate
as the investigation continues. Hence, the company has an inherent
incentive to close the investigation. An investigation requires the firm
to allocate managerial and legal resources to the matter and comes on
top of the company’s standard business. This means the company must
employ its human capital in a different way to address the exigencies
posed by the investigation. 92 But this is only the beginning of the
company’s ordeal.
Because enforcement authorities condition entering into a
settlement on full cooperation on the part of the company and give
companies credit in the form of a reduced fine for cooperating with the
investigating authorities, corporations have a strong incentive to pay
law firms to conduct an internal investigation within the firm and
report the findings to the DOJ or SEC. 93 Since firms are under
enhanced scrutiny at this point, they must ensure that the internal
investigation is comprehensive and uncompromising. Firms are
expected to provide full access to privileged materials, even those that

corporate criminal intent satisfied where no agent’s criminal intent has been shown.
Corporations have been convicted of crimes requiring knowledge on the basis of the
“collective knowledge” of the employees as a group, even though no single employee
possessed sufficient information to know that the crime was being committed.
Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1227, 1248 (1979).
92. See, e.g., Olaf Storbeck, Deutsche Bank Investors Fear Criminal Probe Will Hinder
Turnaround, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/03d9685c-f632-11e8-af462022a0b02a6c [https://perma.cc/B8FQ-NB5Q] (“Investors in Deutsche Bank are concerned that
the criminal investigation into the suspected money laundering activities of the lender’s wealth
management unit will make it harder for chief executive Christian Sewing to execute his crucial
turnaround agenda.”).
93. See, e.g., MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 183
(2014) (“The above general framework best demonstrates the ‘carrots’ embedded in the
[Sentencing] Guidelines . . . . In short, a company subject to FCPA scrutiny will receive a lower
culpability score based on voluntary disclosure, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility,
which then yields a lower multipliers, which then yields a lower fine range.”). The dynamic
Professor Mike Koehler describes is relevant not just to FCPA investigations but to all
investigations. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 316–18 (2007) (describing the approach of enforcement
authorities, which leads to a very tight relationship between the calculation of fines and the level
of cooperation provided by companies, as “carrots” and “sticks”).
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come under the attorney–client privilege,94 and align “their interests
with those of” the DOJ’s or SEC’s attorneys.95
In global companies, the cost of conducting the investigation runs
into the hundreds of millions of dollars.96 If ultimately no agreement is
reached with the enforcement authorities, the resources spent on the
investigation will be wasted. Hence, once a company decides to
conduct an internal investigation, it will try its best to sign a PDA.
In addition to the direct costs of the investigation, criminal
enforcement inflicts indirect costs on firms in the form of reputational
harm,97 loss of business opportunities, and an increased civil litigation
risk. 98 The first two costs are distinct, but related. A criminal
investigation can irreversibly tarnish the reputation of a firm, causing

94. Infra notes 138–39.
95. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2015) (explaining how
AIG cooperated with then-N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer).
96. See generally supra note 19 (providing examples).
97. See Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 68, at 855 (“Organizations feared
the catastrophic punitive fines and severe reputational consequences of a conviction—what one
court described as a ‘matter of life and death.’”); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee &
Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 581, 581
(2008) (examining 585 companies that were targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial
misrepresentation from 1978–2002 and revealing that these companies lost 38 percent of their
market value after news of their misconduct was reported); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott,
Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757,
758–59 (1993) (using data from 132 corporate fraud cases between 1978–1987 to find that the loss
in common-stock value of the affected companies after “initial press reports of allegations or
investigations of corporate fraud against . . . government agencies . . . is 5.05 percent, or $40.0
million”); David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1336 (2013) (“Perhaps most
significantly of all, criminal prosecution has . . . a stigmatizing effect that civil enforcement does
not.”).
98. See Greenblum, supra note 15, at 1885 (“Collateral consequences facing corporations
convicted of a felony are perhaps just as diverse, though more detrimental, than those that attach
to individuals. Corporations can be debarred from government contracting and have their
professional license revoked.”).
Former DOJ attorneys Christopher Wray and Robert Hur note that for health care
providers who extensively rely on federal programs for reimbursement,
exclusion is the equivalent of a corporate death penalty. The authority to impose this
powerful sanction lies with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ Office
of Inspector General . . . . Because a number of health care convictions trigger
mandatory exclusion, companies facing criminal investigation in this [healthcare]
industry necessarily focus on this derivative danger.
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1165 (2006) (citation
omitted).
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it to lose much of its hard-earned goodwill. It creates a cloud of doubt
that hovers over the operation of the firm, making it difficult for the
firm to attract new capital and to maintain its client base.99
The constant press coverage that accompanies the investigation
often augments concerns about the company’s stability and casts doubt
on its future.100 This, in turn, makes it harder for the company to pursue
new business opportunities. It also forces the company to funnel
resources into maintaining business relationships. Once word of the
investigation gets out, financial institutions, suppliers, employees, and
business partners that depend on the suspect firm will seek additional
information about its future and may demand assurances of its longterm sustainability. 101 In parallel, they may pursue other business
opportunities that they deem safer.102
An often-cited example that demonstrates these threats is the case
of Arthur Andersen.103 The story began in 2002, when Andersen was
charged with obstruction of justice for destroying documents in order
99. See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1264 (2016) [hereinafter Uhlmann, The Pendulum
Swings] (“Reputational harm can discourage investment in a company.”).
100. See Jamie L. Gustafson, Note, Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An Analysis of
the Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 697
(2007) (“[P]ublic interest in corporate scandal spiked as a result of the media coverage.”).
Moreover, such an increase in public attention has been translated into an “understanding,
thoughtful outcry against white-collar crime.” Jonathan D. Glater, Mad as Hell: Hard Time for
White-Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/
weekinreview/ideas-trends-mad-as-hell-hard-time-for-white-collar-crime.html?smid=url-share
[https://perma.cc/T6SF-MXEV].
101. Koehler, supra note 20, at 510 (“A criminal investigation and indictment alone could
have enormous adverse consequences even if a company were ultimately acquitted at trial.”).
102. See Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 99, at 1264–65 (“Reputational harm
also can hamper relationships in the broader business community.”).
103. See Cindy A. Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Criminal
Investigations, 34 DEL. J. CORP. 921, 925–27 (2009) (summarizing the case and explaining the
negative impacts on Arthur Andersen as a result of the prosecution); see also Elizabeth K. Ainslie,
Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 107, 109 (2006) (“[T]he indictment, the conviction, and the consequent prohibition against
appearing before the Securities and Exchange Commission were sufficient to kill the company.”);
Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justice’s
Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14–15 (2006) (explaining the devastating
effects of the prosecution on Arthur Andersen); Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 75, at 1306–08
(summarizing the Arthur Andersen case); Peter J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines:
R.I.P.?, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 312, 314 (2007) (“Federal prosecutors use deferred and nonprosecution agreements to accomplish the Guidelines’ goals while avoiding the ‘Arthur Andersen
effect’—the collateral damage from a conviction in which innocent employees unconnected to the
wrongdoing lose their jobs and investments in the firm.”).
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to impede the SEC-led investigation of Enron. The district court
convicted Andersen the same year, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In
2005, the Supreme Court reversed Andersen’s conviction, but it was
too late. Andersen had already lost its Certified Public Accountant
license—since the SEC does not accept audits from convicted firms—
and despite the reversal, Andersen had no chance to reclaim its title as
one of the “big five” accounting firms.104 Eric Holder, who later served
as the attorney general of the United States, described the dire
consequences of the investigation and conviction in 2002:
Nevertheless, for a firm that trades on its reputation, and that was
already facing an exodus of clients, the effect of the indictment and
conviction was close to a death sentence. Thousands of innocent
employees now find themselves out of jobs and, for no good reason,
their professional reputations scarred. The survival of Andersen itself
is in great doubt. Is this an appropriate outcome? I’m not sure.105

The story of Arthur Andersen demonstrates why entering into a
PDA with the enforcement authorities as quickly as possible is most
firms’ top priority once an investigation has begun. Companies under
criminal investigation must strive to reach a settlement at all costs;
waiting is simply not a viable option for most firms, even if it can
ultimately lead to acquittal. The market reaction to a criminal
investigation against a firm can be harsher than any legal punishment
it may face. Dragging out the investigation is a losing strategy in every
aspect. The longer the investigation, the higher the price for a company
in terms of lost business opportunities. All the while, the legal expenses
continue to add up. Hence, the company faces a reality in which its
resources are dwindling while its expenses are mounting.
From both perspectives—the legal perspective and the business
perspective—the best response to a criminal investigation is to strive
to settle it expeditiously, almost regardless of the cost. The alternative,
as the story of Arthur Andersen illustrates, may be the demise of the
corporation. The desire to settle makes perfect sense for the company,
104. Schipani, supra note 103, at 926–27.
105. Eric Holder, Don’t Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1027991133930326640 [https://perma.cc/93DG-GFAX]; see also Alex B.
Heller, Note, Corporate Death Penalty: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Indictment of SAC
Capital, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 763, 763–64 (2015) (“In Andersen’s case, the indictment alone
was a corporate death sentence, even before adjudication. The Anders[e]n case and the lessons
learned in its aftermath have been regarded as a turning point in government decisions to charge
corporate offenders, especially in the financial services industry.” (footnotes omitted)).
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but for the reasons Part II explains, it comes at a dear price for the
individual directors and officers.
3. Plea Agreements. Similar dynamics to those that characterize
PDAs also arise, albeit to a lesser extent, in the context of plea
agreements.106 In parallel to the increase in the use of PDAs, classic
corporate plea agreements continue to be a useful tool for enforcement
authorities. 107 The main difference between PDAs and plea
agreements is that under a plea agreement, the defendant is convicted
of a crime, whereas under a DPA or an NPA, the defendant is not
convicted of any crime.108
There are additional differences as well. First, courts play a more
significant role in overseeing plea agreements. Although both plea
agreements and DPAs may require court approval, there is a difference
between the court’s role in reviewing DPAs and its role in evaluating
plea agreements. As Judge Sri Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit stated in
the famous case of Fokker 109: “[T]he context of a DPA is markedly
different. Unlike a plea agreement—and more like a dismissal under
Rule 48(a)—a DPA involves no formal judicial action imposing or
adopting its terms.”110 And unlike DPAs, NPAs do not require court
106. Alexander & Cohen, supra note 65, at 538 (discussing critiques concerning the use of
DPAs and NPAs).
107. Id. at 562 (reporting that 486 corporate criminal settlements were signed between 1997–
2011 by the DOJ and public companies (or their affiliates), and 329 of these settlements were plea
agreements); see also Data & Documents, CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, http://
lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html [https://perma.cc/
HJD5-9N7R] (set “U.S. Public Company?” field as “Yes” and then search Disposition Type field
for “DP,” “NP,” and “plea”) (reporting that 361 corporate criminal settlements were signed between
1992–2019 by federal agencies and public companies, among which 167 were plea agreements).
108. See Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational
and Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE SERIES 87 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (“DPAs lack the stigmatizing effect of a
corporate conviction.”); Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Non-Prosecution of
Corporations: Toward a Model of Cooperation and Leniency, 96 N.C. L. REV. 859, 862 (2018)
(“Because neither the NPA nor the DPA entails the corporate defendant pleading guilty, we refer
to them as non-plea settlements.”); Greenblum, supra note 15, at 1869 (“A guilty plea [in plea
bargaining] results in a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the
offender had been convicted in a trial.”).
109. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
110. Id. at 746; see also id. at 744–45 (“Whatever may be the precise contours of that authority
of a court to confirm that a DPA’s conditions are aimed to assure the defendant’s good conduct,
it does not permit the court to impose its own views about the adequacy of the underlying criminal
charges.”); JAMES M. ANDERSON & IVAN WAGGONER, THE CHANGING ROLE OF CRIMINAL
LAW IN CONTROLLING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 62 (2014) (“But because DPAs and NPAs are
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approval and do not come under judicial scrutiny at all,
notwithstanding that they too contain broad admissions of guilt. The
weakened role of judicial oversight of PDAs takes away some of the
bargaining power wielded by law enforcement authorities in pleaagreement negotiations.111
Second, in the case of plea agreements, some or much of the factfinding is done by the court, depending on the stage at which the plea
agreement is entered. This may ameliorate the tendency of
enforcement agencies to attribute blame to a large group of directors
and officers collectively and indiscriminately, without even referring to
them by name.
Third, both plea agreements and PDAs include factual admissions
and a waiver of rights. Still, as reported by research fellow Cindy
Alexander and Professor Mark Cohen in their empirical study, PDAs
are more likely than plea agreements to include requirements to waive
privilege.112
Finally, “over 91% of DPAs and 79% of NPAs are found to
require an agreement to the admissibility of a statement of facts and
prior testimony or statements, compared to 38% of all plea
agreements.”113
Despite these differences, both PDAs and plea agreements put
companies under enormous pressure to please the relevant
enforcement authorities in order to avoid a catastrophic result for the
company. To this end, corporations are willing to disregard the
interests of present and, especially, past directors and officers, treating
typically negotiated and executed prior to the indictment, there is no judicial oversight over the
terms of such agreements, so prosecutors do not have to worry about the risk of a judge rejecting
a plea agreement or the terms of probation.”); Recent Cases, Criminal Law—Separation of
Powers—D.C. Circuit Holds That Courts May Not Reject Deferred Prosecution Agreements Based
on the Inadequacy of Charging Decisions or Agreement Conditions.—United States v. Fokker
Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1055 (2017); Peter R. Reilly,
Corporate Deferred Prosecution as Discretionary Injustice, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 839, 871 (2017)
[hereinafter Reilly, Discretionary Injustice] (“[D]istrict courts have a long history of competently
reviewing plea agreements.”); Epstein, supra note 77 (“[DPA agreements can] turn[] the
prosecutor into judge and jury, thus undermining our principles of separation of powers.”). But
see Darryl Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 63, 77–82 (2017) (explaining how judges play a passive role in approving plea agreements).
111. Reilly, Discretionary Injustice, supra note 110, at 869 (“[I]n the context of a DPA, the
prosecutor gets to control all those checks and balances that in trials or plea agreements would
be controlled by judges, juries, and the watching public.”).
112. Alexander & Cohen, supra note 65, at 587.
113. Id.
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them as scapegoats who must bear the blame for the company’s failure.
Furthermore, to enter agreements as quickly as possible, firms
categorically refuse to go to the trouble of distinguishing among those
who sinned and those who did not. This gives rise to the reverse agency
problem.
II. THE REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM
Companies’ desire to reach a settlement with enforcement
authorities gives rise to a hitherto unobserved phenomenon, which we
call “the reverse agency problem.” The reverse agency problem is the
mirror image of the famous managerial agency problem identified by
Berle and Means. They observed that the structure of public
corporations allows directors and officers to promote their narrow selfinterest at the expense of the shareholders.114 This insight has had an
unparalleled impact on corporate-law scholarship, and it is undeniably
correct for corporations in the ordinary course of business.
The opening of a criminal investigation into the firm gives rise to
a new agency problem. In order to save the corporation and its
shareholders from a long criminal prosecution process and a severe
sanction at its end, corporations are willing to admit to wrongdoing in
order to cut their losses and put the investigation behind them.115 En
route to this result, corporations attribute various acts and omissions
to their directors and officers, as required by law enforcement agencies.
This behavior is perfectly rational. Settlements generally maximize
value for the shareholders.116 Yet, they come at a hefty price for the
114. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
115. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, All Stick and No Carrot: The Yates
Memorandum and Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 STETSON L. REV. 7, 31 (2016)
(“[C]orporations have gone along with the government’s proposal because the alternative—a
conviction—can amount ‘to a virtual death sentence for business entities.’” (citation omitted));
Richard Cassin, What’s Wrong with Corporate Criminal Liability?, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 7, 2009, 7:02
PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/8/whats-wrong-with-corporate-criminal-liability.html
[https://perma.cc/JK8E-Z5PF] (“That way, organizations threatened with criminal prosecution
might feel less compelled to rush into settlements with the DOJ that ‘sell out individuals within
the company.’” (citation omitted)).
116. Compare Cunningham, supra note 95, at 20 (“From the perspective of economic
theory, the adverse collateral consequences [of corporate conviction] are essentially negative
externalities, and DPAs are designed to avoid those.”), with Jenny Anderson, A.I.G. Is
Expected To Offer $1.6 Billion To Settle with Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2006), https://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/business/aig-is-expected-to-offer-16-billion-to-settle-withregulators.html [https://perma.cc/U7A9-JQCH] (providing the statement of Howard Opinsky,
a spokesman for Maurice R. Greenberg, who served as the chairman and CEO of AIG that
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directors and officers, and often other employees, who are expected to
“take one for the team” and live with the consequences of the
settlement.
These consequences are severe. Critically, the admissions
implicating corporate officers should not be presumed to be accurate.
They are merely a means to secure a settlement with law enforcement
authorities. 117 The directors and officers who are subject to the
agreement and its statement of facts often do not have a say in the
negotiation process, and even when they do, their voices get muffled.118
The shareholders’ interest takes precedence over that of the directors
and officers. For this reason, we refer to this conflict of interest as “the
reverse agency problem.” This Part explores the effects of criminal
investigations in general, and settlements in particular, on corporate
agents and highlights the dynamics and costs resulting therefrom.
If the investigation results in an agreement or an indictment, the
company is likely to face demands from shareholders to file civil
actions against the directors and officers implicated in the
investigation. 119 Further, the facts stated in the agreement or
indictment provide a fertile ground for shareholders to file their own
derivative suits against the directors and officers. After all, the
documents contain long and detailed descriptions of wrongdoing by the
company’s employees and managers, and oversight failure by the
directors.
The company can respond to such demands in one of three ways.
First, it can accept them—at least in part—and bring actions against
the relevant directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties.
Second, it can set up a special litigation committee to investigate the

settled in 2005 with the SEC for $1.6 billion: “Shareholders lose when companies choose to
settle investigations motivated by political ambition, fueled by threats and settled out of fear
. . . . [A] settlement of this magnitude is merely a political trophy for the attorney general and
totally disproportionate to the impact of the alleged misconduct”).
117. See infra Part II.B.2.
118. Recall, again, that Professor Epstein describes the PDAs as “confessions of a Stalinist
purge trial.” Epstein, supra note 77.
119. See Westbrook, supra note 31, at 1227 (discussing collateral suits triggered by
announcements of penalties or investigations); see also Mark, supra note 67, at 446 (“Beginning
in 2006 or so, the stepped-up enforcement of the FCPA by the DOJ and SEC has sparked a
corresponding increase in collateral civil litigation predicated on facts alleged by the federal
government in enforcement actions.”). Note that sometimes the mere announcement of a
criminal investigation can trigger the filing of derivative actions.
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matter and make recommendations to the board of directors.120 Finally,
it can refuse to take any legal action against the directors and officers.
Refusal to concede to these demands invariably leads to the filing of
derivative actions against the said directors and officers.121
A. When Directors and Officers Come Second
It is impossible to overestimate the role of agency problems in
corporate law.122 There exists a broad consensus among theorists and
lawmakers that a principal goal of corporate law is to mitigate agency
problems, first and foremost those that exist between shareholders and
managers. In a landmark contribution, Berle and Means noted that the
separation between ownership and management, the hallmark of
modern corporations, presents many advantages, but it also has a
downside: it raises a risk that management would transfer wealth from
the shareholders to its members.123
Subsequently, scholars have identified other types of agency
problems—that is, conflicts of interest that are endemic to
corporations. For one, there is a tension between shareholders and
creditors. The former, who are residual value claimants, are willing to
take risks to maximize reward, but the latter, who have a fixed claim,
prefer a much lower level of risk, if any.124 Further, an agency problem
120. See generally C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, How
Do Legal Standards Matter? An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees, 60 J. CORP.
FIN. 1 (2020) (providing more updated empirical data regarding the recommendations of special
litigation committees); Minor Myers, The Decision of the Corporate Special Litigation
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309 (2009) (discussing the mechanism of
the special litigation committees and providing empirical data regarding the recommendations of
these committees through the years).
121. Of course, there are also costs for the firm. Although the main target of derivative actions
are the directors and officers, not the company itself, derivative actions represent an unwelcome
development for the company. The filing of such an action constitutes a serious distraction from
the perspective of the company. If it is filed against present directors and officers, it prevents them
from focusing exclusively on the affairs of the company. See Storbeck, supra note 92 (discussing
how a money-laundering investigation of Deutsche Bank would divert attention from the
operative business). Furthermore, since directors and officers are typically entitled to
reimbursement of their legal expenses, it is the company that ends up footing the legal bills.
Finally, the filing of derivative actions further harms the reputation of the company and hobbles
its ability to do business.
122. See, e.g., Goshen & Squire, supra note 3, at 769 (“For the last forty years, the problem of
agency costs has dominated the study of corporate law and governance.”).
123. See sources cited supra notes 1–2.
124. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
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exists between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 125
This problem focuses on the ability of majority shareholders to enrich
themselves at the minority’s expense by forcing management to play
along with this plan. Finally, Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey
Gordon have identified yet another type of agency problem that arises
between institutional investors and standard shareholders. In this case,
the misalignment of interests arises from the different investment
strategies of the two groups and their varying willingness to actively
monitor and engage the management of companies in which they
invest.126
This Article adds to the canon of agency problems by drawing
attention to the reverse agency problem that is gaining prominence in
the compliance age. The reverse agency problem arises in the context
of the enforcement actions against corporations. To reach an expedient
resolution of the investigations against them, corporations are willing
to accede to the demands of law enforcement authorities. Reaching a
settlement is in the best interest of all parties involved. From the
vantage point of the law enforcement authorities, settlements save
scarce resources and allow the initiation of additional enforcement
actions against other firms.127 From the perspective of firms, the sooner
an investigation ends, the better. Settling the case means dramatic cost
savings for the firm, relative to the option of indictment.128 It also frees
APPROACH 30 (Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry
Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mariana Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe
& Edward Rock eds., 3d ed. 2017) (discussing how owners may behave opportunistically toward
creditors, employees, and customers).
125. Id.; see also Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22–23 (2000) (describing how controlling
shareholders “tunnel” resources out of a company and to themselves).
126. See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 865 (“Record owners prefer exit to the
exercise of governance rights even when a governance approach is more valuable to the beneficial
owners.”).
127. U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.010 (2011) [hereinafter
Attorneys’ Manual], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-22000-pretrial-diversion-program#9-22.010
[https://perma.cc/3SEQ-N4BX] (“The major objectives of pretrial diversion are . . . [t]o save
prosecutive and judicial resources for concentration on major cases.”); see also Christie Ford &
David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679,
680–81 (2009) (discussing the argument that monitorships achieve the same effect as a conviction
but without the costs); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 68, at 901 (suggesting
that settlements save DOJ resources); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 75, at 1730 (suggesting
that monitors are a means of saving government resources).
128. As Judge Kaplan stated in the case of KPMG: “Many companies faced with allegations
of wrongdoing are under intense pressure to avoid indictment, as an indictment—especially of a
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up the company’s human resources, allowing the company to focus
exclusively on its business.129 Finally, it removes a cloud of uncertainty
from the firm130 and signals to the market that the company has gotten
back on track.131
But the consequences of a settlement are very different for
employees and officers who were implicated in the investigation than
they are for the company itself. The opening of a criminal investigation
is like the opening of a Pandora’s box. The investigation is certain to
change the lives of the individual directors, officers, and employees
implicated for the worse. This is so for two reasons.
First, the correspondence, documents, and actions of those
involved in the investigation will be scrutinized and analyzed for
evidence of wrongdoing. Although this is a necessary measure, it
exposes the inner world of business organizations and brings to light
materials that were presumed to be private.
The famous case of KPMG 132 is illustrative. In 2003, the DOJ
launched a criminal investigation against KPMG and many of its
employees concerning the creation, marketing, and implementation of
illegal tax shelters. The DOJ utilized KPMG’s vulnerability, pitting the

financial services firm—threatens to destroy the business regardless of whether the firm
ultimately is convicted or acquitted.” United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
129. See, e.g., A. F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 271 (1984) (“A less conspicuous but equally immediate cost of the
derivative suit will be consumption of the time of the corporate officers and directors and their
staffs and the consequent diversion of their best efforts from production and distribution.”);
Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 272 n.27 (1986).
Interestingly, courts permit boards of public companies and special litigation committees
appointed by the boards to take into account, when considering a demand for a derivative suit,
the time that corporate managers and directors will spend participating in a trial. See, e.g., Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he court can consider the degree to which key
personnel may be distracted from corporate business by continuance of the litigation.”).
130. Notably, “[i]n reality, it would almost never be possible to predict lost business from
reputational damage.” Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 99, at 1254–55.
131. See Brandon Garrett, International Corporate Prosecutions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS *11 (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Bettina
Weisser eds., 2019) (“[R]epresentatives of companies sometimes also prefer a swifter conclusion
to a case to minimise the reputational risks to their corporation.” (quoting OECD WORKING
GRP. ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OEOCD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONTENTION IN NORWAY § 24 (June 2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconvention/Norwayphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/V77P-QWTU])).
132. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
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company against its own employees, as described at length in Judge
Lewis Kaplan’s decision:
The government took full advantage. It sought interviews with many
KPMG employees and encouraged KPMG to press the employees to
cooperate. Indeed, it urged KPMG to tell employees to disclose any
personal criminal wrongdoing. When individuals balked, the
prosecutors told KPMG. In each case, KPMG reiterated its threat to
cut off payment of legal fees unless the government were satisfied
with the individual’s cooperation. In some cases, it told the employees
to cooperate with prosecutors or be fired. The government obtained
statements, commonly known as proffers, from nine KPMG
employees who now are defendants here (the “Moving Defendants”)
. . . . Having considered the evidence, the Court is persuaded that the
government is responsible for the pressure that KPMG put on its
employees. It threatened KPMG with the corporate equivalent of
capital punishment. KPMG took the only course open to it.133

Judge Kaplan then proceeded to state that prosecutors’ use of the
Thompson Memo has produced “the exertion of enormous economic
power by the employer upon its employees to sacrifice their
constitutional rights.”134 Ultimately, the court suppressed many of the
statements made by individuals within KPMG, finding that they were
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.135
The case of KPMG is not an outlier or an isolated example; on the
contrary, it is highly representative of the DOJ’s policy. Eastern
District of New York Judge John Gleeson noted in the oft-cited case
of HSBC that:
Recent history is replete with instances where the requirements of
such cooperation have been alleged and/or held to violate a
company’s attorney-client privilege and work product protections, or
its employees’ Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.136

133. Id. at 318–19.
134. Id. at 337.
135. Id. at 338.
136. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2013). Judge John Gleeson added that “for nearly ten years—from 1999 to 2008—the
Department of Justice’s corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder, Thompson,
McCallum, and McNulty Memos, emphasized the importance of corporate cooperation, including
a willingness to waive the attorney-client and work product protections[;]” that “[t]he DOJ’s
corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder and Thompson Memos, also instructed
federal prosecutors to consider the extent to which a cooperating company makes witnesses
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This concern over violating employees’ Fifth Amendment rights
in the context of a criminal investigation within the firm also has
attracted the attention of the academy. 137 Legal counsels, too, have
voiced serious concerns about the DOJ’s “culture of waiver.”138 And as
the DOJ itself acknowledged:
The Department’s policy with respect to privilege waivers became the
subject of intense lobbying of Congress by the defense bar and the
business community over the next few years. The American Bar
Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National
Association of Manufacturers decried what they claimed was a
“culture of waiver,” in which prosecutors almost immediately
demanded privilege waivers upon initiation of an investigation.139

Second, the opening of a criminal investigation casts a heavy
shadow on the integrity and reputation of the board and management
available to the government[;]” and that “[t]he DOJ’s corporate charging policies . . . also
instructed federal prosecutors to consider a company’s advancing of legal fees to employees,
except as required by law, as potentially indicative of an attempt to shield culpable individuals,
and therefore a factor weighing in favor of indictment of the company.” Id. at *6 nn.10–12.
137. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613,
1634–35 (2007) (“If firms are to require their agents to say what they know, some reason must be
given to induce the agent to speak. The reason can only be what rests within the firm’s control:
denial of the compensation or employment that the firm confers upon the employee.”); T.H.
Waters III, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Examination of a “Costly” Right to Silence for
Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REV. LITIG. 603, 605–06 (2006) (“The
leverage gained from the corporation’s compliance forces the employee to cooperate or risk
losing her job.”).
138. The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 68 (2006) (statement
of the Coalition To Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege) (“Almost 75% of both inside and
outside counsel who responded to this question expressed agreement (almost 40% agreeing
strongly) with a statement that a ‘culture of waiver’ has evolved” where “governmental agencies
believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to expect a company under investigation to
broadly waive attorney-client privilege or work product protections.”).
139. James McMahon, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 64 U.S. ATT’YS’
BULL. 1, 2 (2016). As the bulletin explains, “[w]ith the August 2008 release of the Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations—known informally as the Filip Memo—federal
prosecutors, under most circumstances, are no longer permitted to ask a cooperating corporation
or entity to waive its attorney-client or work product privileges as part of its cooperation.” Id. at
1. However, in 2015, the DOJ issued the Yates Memo, which requires a company to disclose “all
relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct” for the company “[t]o be
eligible for any cooperation credit.” Yates Memo, supra note 12, at 2–3; see also Gideon Mark,
The Yates Memorandum, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1589, 1602 (2018) (“Nevertheless, the consensus
of the defense bar was that the Filip Memorandum did not cure the waiver problem created by
prior Memoranda, with the result that counsel would often be forced to risk waiver in order to
avoid an adverse DOJ action.”).
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of the suspect firm. This effect is unavoidable. The moment an
investigation is announced, the directors and top managers have to deal
with a whirlwind of rumors and suspicions that are kept alive by
constant media coverage, as well as stories on blogs and social media.140
These rumors and suspicions cannot be easily set aside or disproved.141
In short, the announcement of an investigation marks the
beginning of the via dolorosa for the individuals implicated. Naturally,
the investigation may lead to three possible outcomes: a finding of no
wrongdoing, a settlement, or an indictment. Obviously, the best
possible option from the vantage point of the company and its
employees is the first one. Unfortunately, very few investigations have
a happy ending; 142 a settlement or an indictment is a much more
realistic outcome.
As Part I discussed, a considerable number of investigations end
in a settlement. As a part of the settlement, the company makes a series
of admissions of wrongdoing, which it cannot later renounce. It must
also sign a statement of facts that is appended to the settlement
agreement. The statement, too, contains a long and detailed
enumeration of factual findings, which the firm is not allowed to
140. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473,
501 (2006) (“Upon observing an instance of entity fault for criminality, persons may be less willing
to contract with, employ, and rely upon individuals known to have contributed, in some way at
least, to the formation of institutional conditions that produced that criminality.”); see also id. at
502 (“The extent of both of these effects of reputational sanction on a firm is likely to vary
according to a given individual’s position within the organization,” and “[t]he more senior and
responsible a person . . . the more likely that others will conclude that the message of firm fault
conveys something significant about the individual.”).
141. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 792, 792 tbl.7 (1993) (finding that companies
charged with defrauding customers and other stakeholders have lower operating earnings over
the following five years). In fact, practitioners have designed complicated strategies to deal with
potential reputational loss following the announcement of an investigation. See, e.g., Kevin Bailey
& Charlie Potter, Protecting Corporate Reputation in a Government Investigation, GLOB.
INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/chapter/1079418/
protecting-corporate-reputation-in-a-government-investigation [https://perma.cc/83DC-TY7M]
(laying out a comprehensive communications strategy for use throughout an investigation).
142. Based on data retrieved from the Corporate Prosecution Registry, a database that provides
comprehensive and up-to-date information on federal organizational prosecutions in the United
States, out of the 3,658 criminal investigations conducted on corporations—among which 325 were
on public corporations—between 1992–2020, only 209 resulted in acquittal, dismissal, or
declination—of which twenty were public corporations. Data & Documents, CORP. PROSECUTION
REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html
[https://perma.cc/8C3B-4AAS] (search Disposition Type field for “All,” “acquittal,” “dismissal,”
and “declination”).
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dispute, deny, or challenge, lest the agreement be rescinded.
Frequently, the statements of facts describe the wrongdoing of the
company, its managers, and its directors in very strong language,
stating that they “knowingly” and “willfully” violated the law or
“knowingly” failed to implement and maintain controls to address
known risks.
Since firms are artificial entities, they cannot commit the elements
of the criminal offenses attributed to them on their own; they must
operate through human agents. It is the actions and mindsets of the
corporation’s employees that establish the actus reus and mens rea of
the offenses of which the corporation is accused. Accordingly,
settlement agreements and statements of facts attribute various illegal
actions, omissions, mental states, and intents to various agents of the
firm. 143 At the end of the process, the DOJ issues a press release
describing in great detail the terms of the agreements and the
confession made by the corporation.
The number of individual employees involved in a criminal
investigation can be very high. When striving to finalize an agreement
and collect a significant fine, law enforcement authorities do not
typically dwell on the wording. Nor does the company under
investigation.144 Both parties are interested in a quick resolution.145 The
directors, officers, and other employees get caught in the middle.
Although corporations are willing to sacrifice both former and
present employees to reach a settlement, there is an important

143. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, 2017-YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (NPAS) AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
(DPAS) 4 (2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2017-year-endNPA-DPA-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5RW-H5NY] (“Most NPAs and DPAs require a clear
acknowledgement by the company that the statement of facts is ‘true and accurate,’ and that the
company bears responsibility for the actions of officers, directors, employees and agents acting
on its behalf.”).
144. As Professor Koehler notes,
Prosecutors have far less leverage over individuals. People, unlike corporations, often
face the prospect of incarceration and financial ruin in the event of a criminal
conviction. As a result, individuals are more likely to test the government’s legal
theories and version of the facts . . . . [P]rosecutors know from their interactions with
lawyers for individuals that, unlike with the corporation, they are likely to have a fight
on their hands if they bring charges.
Koehler, supra note 20, at 554 (quoting Matthew E. Fishbein, Why Individuals Aren’t
Prosecuted for Conduct Companies Admit, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://
www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202670499295/Why-Individuals-Arent-Prosecutedfor-Conduct-Companies-Admit [https://perma.cc/JPB9-JUNK]).
145. See Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, supra note 11, at 1120 (explaining how DPAs “can be a
means to: speedy and efficient dispute resolution”).
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difference between its treatments of the two groups. While present
employees can have an indirect and limited effect on the negotiations
leading to the agreement, former employees are excluded from the
process altogether. But a clarification is in order here. As discussed
above, the investigation is often conducted by external law firms and
consultants that are hired for this purpose. They interview past and
present directors, managers, and employees who are relevant to the
investigation. Hence, those interviewed receive an opportunity to
share their versions of what happened. Thereafter, the attorneys
negotiate and draft the terms of the settlement agreement, including
the exact wording of the statement of facts. Present directors and
officers must approve the agreement on behalf of the corporation.
Thus, they have an opportunity to review the draft and introduce very
marginal changes to the wording, but they cannot realistically achieve
more than this, as all the bargaining power lies with the law
enforcement authorities.
This is especially true given that the final version of the agreement
is provided to the board of directors for review only a few days before
the date of signing. Although presiding directors get a chance to review
the agreement before its approval, they are not involved in any way in
the preparation of the agreement. Furthermore, when a settlement is
presented to the board, the board faces a binary choice: approve or face
the risk that the DOJ will reopen its investigation and stiffen its
stand.146
Past employees are in worse shape. Their approval of the
agreement is not required. They do not get a chance to review the
agreement, nor do they receive an opportunity to comment on it.
Worse yet, the present directors and officers have a strong economic
motivation to settle expeditiously regardless of the ramifications for
past employees. After all, they are eager to put the criminal
investigation behind them, and they owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation, not to their predecessors.147
At this point, one might wonder: Why is all of this problematic? If
an employee, current or former, committed a criminal offense, she

146. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Principles of Federal Prosecution § 9-27.110 app. F (2018), https://
www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.110 [https://perma.cc/7FV9HZVW] (emphasizing the broad latitude of prosecutors).
147. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers and directors . . .
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.” (emphasis added)).
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should live with the consequences, whether or not she was given a fair
hearing. But therein lies the rub. Many individual directors and officers
have not violated the law and cannot be assumed to have done so. Even
though the liability of a corporation is based on the acts, omissions,
intent, and mental states of its officers and employees, it is much easier
to assign criminal liability to a corporation than to its individual
employees.148
As explained earlier, a corporation may be found guilty of criminal
behavior even when no employee has committed a criminal offense on
her own. In the case of individual liability, all the elements of a criminal
offense must be performed by one person. But in the case of corporate
liability, it is possible to collect elements from different employees and
attribute them as a whole to the corporation.
Accordingly, it is impossible to derive personal liability from the
liability of the firm. This is not merely a theoretical point. Attempts by
law enforcement authorities to prosecute officers of corporations that
admitted to wrongdoing often result in acquittals; in many cases,
enforcement authorities did not try to prosecute them.149 Furthermore,
it is often not even possible to impose civil liability on directors and
officers pursuant to settlements. 150 Thus, there is a gulf between
corporate liability and personal liability.
Yet settlements are not sensitive to this fact. They are drafted in a
sweeping manner that pays no heed to the consequences for the
148. See Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, supra
note 91, at 1248 (noting that “proving that a corporate defendant committed the illegal act is in
practice substantially easier than an individual prosecution,” as it is only necessary to prove that
“some agent of the corporation committed the crime”).
149. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 139, at 1605–07 (describing “the DOJ’s historical failure to
prosecute” officers of corporations engaged in PDAs).
150. One famous example is the case of the oil-and-gas services company Tidewater. See
Tidewater, Inc. ex rel. Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. La. 2012). After the company
resolved the FCPA investigation by signing a PDA, a derivative suit was filed against Tidewater’s
directors. Id. at 440. The district court in Louisiana dismissed the suit, concluding that:
While Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show that Tidewater was evidently
violating both the FCPA and the Exchange Act, nowhere in the Complaint do
Plaintiff’s allegations meet the specificity to show that the Individual Defendants were
acting with the intent to violate these laws. “[T]he mere fact that the violation occurred
does not demonstrate that the board acted in bad faith.”
Id. at 451 (quoting Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2011)). As Professor
Koehler, a compliance expert, puts it: “Not only was the Tidewater derivative claim
representative of the type of derivative claims frequently brought in the FCPA context, it was
also representative of the outcome.” Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM.
U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 437 (2014).
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individual employees. Of course, from a purely legal perspective, the
admissions and statements made by corporations do not bind
individual directors, officers, and employees. They do not constitute
res judicata as far as personal liability is concerned. However, from a
practical perspective, the consequences for individual employees are
severe.
Employees covered by PDAs do not have an opportunity to
disagree with the statements that were made about them. They cannot
initiate a legal proceeding to clear their name or even challenge the
factual accuracy of the statements that pertain to them. Their only
chance to do so is when a personal investigation is opened or if
shareholders decide to bring derivative actions against them. But even
this opportunity is more illusory than real.
The broad and unequivocal admissions found in settlements and
statements of facts practically invite the filing of derivative actions
against the individuals who are mentioned in them. The signing of a
settlement is almost invariably a prelude to civil litigation.151 Plaintiffs
in derivative actions base their prima facie case on the admissions made
by a company in its settlement with the DOJ or other law enforcement
authorities.152
Plaintiffs often quote extensively from the admissions and findings
in settlement agreements, which do not carefully address the potential
personal liability of each individual director and officer. The
admissions and findings list all directors, officers, and other employees
whose names were mentioned in the annual reports of the company
during the years described in the settlement agreement as defendants
and treat them as a monolithic group. This uniform treatment—what
this Article describes as a “pooling effect”—is further discussed in Part
II.B.
The point here is that private plaintiffs have neither the
capabilities nor the incentives to distinguish between good directors
and officers and bad ones. In general, these plaintiffs are individual
shareholders who have very limited access to information about the
company and its officers and directors.153 Furthermore, they frequently
have only a miniscule stake in the company and therefore “ha[ve] very
151. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 86–87
(2007).
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little incentive to consider the effect of the action on other
shareholders” and the company as a whole.154
The directors and officers, who are listed as defendants, do not get
a real opportunity to exonerate themselves. As Professor Amy
Westbrook puts it more generally: “The majority of the recent
shareholder derivative suits filed in the wake of FCPA actions have
been dismissed, a handful have settled, and none have been fully
litigated on the merits.”155
In sum, innocent directors and officers implicated in settlements
do not have a real way to vindicate themselves. They have to live with
the admissions and statements of facts made by their corporations. The
ramifications for these individuals—who have done no wrong—are
dire and far-reaching. Their reputations are irremediably harmed, as
are their future employability and earning capacities.156 They have to
deal with the financial and emotional consequences of a long criminal
investigation that is often followed by civil litigation. All the while, they
are featured in uncomplimentary media reports. Worst of all, no extant
law gives them an opportunity to set the record straight.
The population of top corporate executives can be characterized
as a small community. As Professor Edward Rock points out, “the
senior managers and directors of large, publicly held corporations, and
the lawyers who advise them . . . form a surprisingly small and closeknit community. The directors of large, publicly held corporations
number roughly four to five thousand.” 157 And Professor Jayne
Barnard further observes that “[i]n such a community, information
travels, impressions are formed and hardened, loyalties are tested, and
reputations are built and dismantled, extremely efficiently, often with

154. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 129, at 271.
155. Westbrook, supra note 31, at 1228; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, FCPA Follow-On Civil
Actions: Frequently Filed, Less Frequently Successful, D&O DIARY (June 18, 2017), https://
www.dandodiary.com/2017/06/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/fcpa-follow-civil-actionsfrequently-filed-less-frequently-successful [https://perma.cc/8RKJ-S7NX] (explaining the
infrequency that such cases find success).
156. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998) (“While litigation is unlikely to cost [corporate managers
and directors] their jobs, liability can damage their reputations and future careers.”).
157. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997).
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just a few phone calls. In a rarefied community such as this, the role of
reputation is significant.”158
Finally, the allegations of wrongdoing made against directors and
other top officers may cause institutional investors to vote against the
directors’ reelection159 or to act in order to fire other senior executives.
And large institutional investors have become involved in monitoring
the legal and regulatory compliance of public companies in which they
invest.
B. The Pooling Effect
A root cause of the reverse agency problem is the collective
treatment of directors and officers in settlements and the insinuation
and attribution of various elements of wrongdoing to them in order to
establish the guilt of the corporation in which they serve. A typical
agreement begins with a statement that the company admits, accepts,
and acknowledges that it is responsible under U.S. law for the acts of
its officers, directors, employees, and agents. Later, the agreement
describes in great detail how the company, via the actions and
omissions of its managers and employees, broke the law during the
time period covered by the agreement. The agreement also describes
how directors failed to adopt and implement an adequate compliance
program and how this failure enabled the wrongdoing.
Agreements do not distinguish between law-abiding and diligent
officers, directors, and employees and their peers who broke the law or
breached their fiduciary duties. Moreover, no names are mentioned in
agreements; managers and directors are treated as an indistinguishable
monolithic group. Thus, a pooling equilibrium is created. To illustrate,
consider some of the largest agreements signed during the past few
years, discussed earlier in Part II.A.
For instance, the plea agreement signed by KBR states that
“Kellogg Brown & Root LLC admits, accepts, and acknowledges that
it is responsible for the acts of its predecessor companies’ officers,

158. Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
959, 966 (1999).
159. See Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate
Compliance, 105 IOWA L. REV. 507, 551–52 (2020) (detailing Vanguard’s vote against reelecting
board members of a U.S. financial institution that had committed fraud).
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employees, and agents as set forth below.”160 Likewise, the DPA that
HSBC entered into following allegations of BSA violations proclaims
that “[t]he HSBC Parties admit, accept and acknowledge that they are
responsible for the acts of their officers, directors, employees, and
agents.”161 Similar statements are in the settlement agreements signed
by Telia, 162 Petrobras, 163 and USB. 164 These examples are
representative. The drafters of the agreements intentionally keep the
language broad and vague, imputing potential responsibility to large
groups of executives without distinguishing among them.
Notably, some agreements contain language suggesting that had
the matter been litigated, the consequences for the company would
have been dire. For example, the agreement with KBR contains the
following clause: “Had this matter proceeded to trial, the United States
would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt, by admissible
evidence, the facts alleged in the Information.”165 Such statements send
a strongly negative signal about the parties involved, suggesting they
managed to avoid a sure criminal conviction.
As a matter of fact, the pooling effect discussed above takes place
not only in the agreements themselves. It begins much earlier, at the
moment an investigation is announced. Once an investigation has been
160. Plea Agreement at 33, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter KBR Plea Agreement].
161. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. HSBC, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL
3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
162. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. Telia Co. AB, No. 1:17-CR00581-GBD (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The agreement states:
The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible under United
States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as charged in the
Information, and as set forth in the attached Statement of Facts, and that the allegations
described in the Information and the facts described in the attached Statement of Facts
are true and accurate.
Id.
163. Letter from Sandra Moser, Acting Chief, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to F. Joseph Warin, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible under United
States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as set forth in the attached
Statement of Facts, and that the facts described therein are true and accurate.”).
164. Letter from Geoffrey S. Berman, U.S. Att’y, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Boyd M. Johnson III,
Esq., Wilmer Hale LLP, & Samuel W. Seymour, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1035081/download [https://perma.cc/2KSQ6EWN] (“USB stipulates that the facts set forth in the Statement of Facts, . . . are true and
accurate, and admits, accepts and acknowledges that it is responsible under United States law for
the acts of its current and former officers and employees as set forth in the Statement of Facts.”).
165. KBR Plea Agreement, supra note 160, at 33.
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initiated, the suspect company must issue an immediate report to notify
the public of this development. In addition, the company is legally
obliged to mention the ongoing investigation against it in quarterly and
annual reports. These reports persist over a long period of time. In
2016, the median duration of FCPA enforcement actions was 4.25
years. 166 During this time period, a gray cloud hangs over all of the
company’s directors and officers,167 and a statute of limitations brings
no relief. 168 The public reports of the company describe how the
company is subject to a criminal investigation and, in some cases, reveal
that the investigation identified certain practices and transactions that
likely constitute violations of law.
Finally, the pooling effect continues in formal publications made
by enforcement authorities. After an agreement is signed, the
enforcement authorities typically issue a press release that describes it
in great detail. The content of the release resembles the language used
in the agreements and statements of facts. The enforcement
authorities, for their part, have no incentive to soften the harsh
language of the agreements; on the contrary, they want to send a clear
and unequivocal message to the rest of the market about the tough
consequences of breaking the law.
News about a settlement agreement spreads fast. Publications
made by authorities focus on the companies’ admissions and the large
fines they agreed to pay. The large penalties draw enormous public
attention to the publications, and readers are inevitably exposed to the

166. The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny Lasted Too Long in 2016, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6,
2017) [hereinafter The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny], http://fcpaprofessor.com/gray-cloud-fcpascrutiny-lasted-long-2016 [https://perma.cc/T6T6-P3VA].
167. Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA’s Long Shadow, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/6/the-fcpas-long-shadow.html [https://perma.cc/2MEA-BRUM] (“The
threat of FCPA enforcement after a company self reports casts a long shadow. It darkens the future for
management, shareholders, lenders, customers, and suppliers. Exactly the problem the statute of
limitations was supposed to fix.”).
168. As one commentator explains:
Statute[s] of limitations are ordinarily the remedy the law provides for legal gray
clouds. Yet in corporate FCPA enforcement actions, the fundamental black-letter legal
principle of statute of limitations seems not to matter because cooperation is the name
of the game and to raise bona fide legal arguments such as statute of limitations is not
cooperating in an investigation. Given the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving
corporate FCPA enforcement actions, one of the first steps a company the subject of
FCPA scrutiny often does to demonstrate its cooperation is agree to toll the statute of
limitations or waive any statute of limitations defenses.
The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny, supra note 166.
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admissions of guilt referencing the management and board of the
relevant companies, who are once again referred to as a guilty group.
These publications aggravate the plight of innocent directors and
officers, adding an element of public shaming to their ordeal. This
effect is accentuated by the motivation of enforcement agents to
aggrandize their own achievements169 in order to bolster their statutory
enforcement powers. 170 This concern is exacerbated by the lack of
procedural safeguards on enforcement agencies’ publications.171 When
issuing a publication, enforcement authorities are generally not
required to give prior notice or an opportunity to the company or its
agents to be heard.172 From the beginning of the investigation process
until its end, the executives of the suspect company are treated as a
monolithic group. Neither the companies nor the enforcement
authorities have an incentive to carefully differentiate among
wrongdoers and innocent parties. Both groups are pooled together.
C. The Near Irrelevance of Standard Defense Mechanisms to the
Reverse Agency Problem
Thus far, this Part has analyzed in great detail the adverse effect
the reverse agency problem has on corporate officers and directors.
The reverse agency problem makes it harder and more expensive for
corporations to hire good directors, managers, and key employees. Of
course, directors and officers who strayed from the right path should
be held accountable for their decisions. As this Article has emphasized
time and again, corporate officers who broke the law should be
subjected to the appropriate penalties. The problem is that quite often
law enforcement authorities do not go to the trouble of assigning
personal liability. In settlement agreements, all those involved are
pooled together. Nor do corporations wish to expend the resources to
distinguish among culpable and innocent employees, given that
corporations hope to settle the matter as quickly as possible. Currently,
there is no way out of this pooling equilibrium.

169. See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1379.
170. See Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1380, 1398–1401 (1973) (describing how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
Environmental Protection Agency use publicity to broaden their enforcement powers).
171. Cortez, supra note 169, at 1374.
172. Id. at 1383; see also Gellhorn, supra note 170, at 1420 (“[U]sually no protection other
than the common sense and good will of the administrator prevents unreasonable use of coercive
publicity.”).
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This state of affairs adversely affects good directors and managers.
In a world with perfect separation between good directors and officers
and bad ones, everyone will be rewarded and punished based on their
performance. However, in the age of settlements, corporate directors
and officers may bear the cost of the misdeeds of others. They no
longer have full control of their own fate. Enforcement actions, and the
settlements signed in their wake, create interdependencies among
corporate agents. Sometimes, one director or corporate officer who
took matters into her own hands and broke the law can get an entire
corporation and its top personnel in trouble.
Over the years, corporate law has adopted several mechanisms to
protect directors and officers from legal liability and thereby lower
operation costs for firms. Standard theorizing assumes that higher
exposure to legal liability must be offset by higher compensation.
Hence, if directors and officers face a high risk of legal liability, they
would require higher pay to offset this risk.173 The central mechanisms
designed to shelter directors and officers from liability are the business
judgment rule, exculpation clauses, directors and officers’ (“D&O”)
liability insurance, and indemnification clauses.
The business judgment rule immunizes directors and corporate
officers against liability for harms arising from mistaken business
decisions, as long as a decision was informed, made in good faith, and
without a conflict of interest. 174 Exculpatory clauses are contractual
provisions that relieve high-level employees from liability arising from
a breach of a duty of care owed to the corporation.175 D&O liability
insurance protects the directors and officers of a corporation against
personal losses resulting from a suit against them for violating a duty

173. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1984) (explaining how corporate liability imposes legal risks on
corporate decisionmakers and, accordingly, how “competent corporate decisionmakers will
either demand insulation from them or require compensation for bearing them”). Put simply,
The director will not serve unless the package offered meets his or her reservation
utility . . . level of other pay necessary to compensate the director for . . . any uninsured
risk. Thus, other forms of director compensation are hypothesized to be substitutes for
D&O insurance, for a decrease in the level of D&O insurance results in an increase in
the amount of other pay required by the director as compensation for the additional
risk (the “risk premium”).
John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 64 J. RISK & INS.
63, 66–67 (1997).
174. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020).
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to the firm. 176 And indemnification clauses guarantee directors and
officers reimbursement for attorneys’ fees, legal expenditures, and
even judgments.177
Although each of these mechanisms operates differently, they
share a common purpose. They aim to relieve directors and officers of
the need to incur costs or pay damages for negligent breaches of the
duty of care owed to the corporation. For their part, corporations are
willing to limit the legal liability of their directors and managers given
that it lowers executive compensation.
Critically, though, two of these mechanisms—the business
judgement rule and exculpation clauses—are not relevant in the
context of criminal investigations. They are only available in the
internal relationship between directors and officers and their firms.
The other two mechanisms—indemnification and insurance—are
subject to “boundaries”178 and depend on the company’s willingness to
provide them, the documents governing them, and the terms of the
insurance policy. 179 At any rate, none of these mechanisms can
compensate directors and officers for the reputational and economic
harms they suffer as a result of criminal investigations and settlements.
These harms lie outside the ken of protection firms can provide.180

176. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicating Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from
the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487 (2007)
(“Nearly all public corporations purchase D&O policies.”).
177. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a).
178. For example, under Delaware corporation law, directors and officers who are
determined to have acted in bad faith or unlawfully cannot be indemnified. Id. Also, D&O
insurance policies generally exclude coverage for intentionally dishonest and criminal conduct,
willful violations of law, and the like. See, e.g., Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca,
Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and
Practical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573, 598–607 (1996).
179. Monteleone & Conca, supra note 178, at 598–607. Furthermore, that insurance coverage
is not unlimited. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors and
Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 805 (2009) (“If, as is
generally the case, D&O insurance limits are significantly lower than potential investor losses.”);
see also id. at 798 (“The insurer will have two principal case-specific interests: first, and most
obviously, to reduce settlement payouts; and second, to maximize investment returns by delaying
the payout of invested capital.”).
180. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1833 (2001)
(describing how defenses that the company provides to its directors and managers, such as
insurance and indemnification, cannot protect them from reputational consequences); see also
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 52
(2008) (“[T]he prevailing norms of director behavior are stricter and less forgiving than the
liability rules by which directors are evaluated.”).
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Since companies cannot offer directors and officers adequate
protection against the reverse agency problem, they must inflate
directors’ and officers’ compensation to reflect the increased risk to
which they are exposed. 181 Given that it is impossible to know in
advance which directors and officers would be affected by the higher
risk—after all, enforcement actions can be random—firms would have
to increase managerial compensation across the board. In some cases,
the promise of higher compensation will suffice to persuade competent
directors and managers to assume the risk. In others, potential
directors and officers may decide to pursue different career
opportunities. On the margins, the reverse agency problem may drive
capable candidates away from the corporate world. 182 This effect
should be especially high among risk-averse individuals, who would
require very high compensation to take on extra risk. Indeed, there is
already some evidence suggesting this effect is felt in the corporate
world.183
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Part considers possible mechanisms to address the reverse
agency problem. Again, a root cause of the reverse agency problem is
the collective treatment of directors and officers in settlements and the
insinuation and attribution of various elements of wrongdoing to them
in order to establish the guilt of the corporation in which they serve.
The sweeping statements that are made about directors, officers,
and other employees without giving them a way to clear their names
are neither fair nor efficient. Directors and officers involved in criminal
investigations need a way to prove that they are neither guilty of a
criminal offense nor of a breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation.
To this end, this Part outlines four specific legal mechanisms that can
ameliorate the reverse agency problem. These proposals are intended
181. Supra note 173.
182. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1140 (2006) (“A significantly higher level of risk for outside directors could well
deter good candidates from serving . . . .”); see also Risks Facing Directors & Officers, FINANCIER
W ORLDWIDE (Aug. 2016), https://www.financierworldwide.com/roundtable-risks-facingdirectors-officers-aug16#.X7fcE9NKhTY [https://perma.cc/H9LE-5GQE] (“[T]he potential to
unfairly blame individuals when not warranted under the circumstances will only serve to deter
qualified people from seeking out and taking director and officer positions.”).
183. See Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
471, 488 (2018) (“No wonder, then, that corporate managers, whenever they get a chance, express
vocal complaints and fears about the potential ‘death knell’ represented by the imposition of
criminal liability on their firms.”).
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to break the pooling effect created by settlements and allow innocent
and diligent directors and officers to distinguish themselves from their
peers who broke the law.
The first mechanism seeks to amplify the voice of individual
corporate officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to
a hearing prior to the finalization of a settlement. This would enable
individual directors and officers to review settlements and offer
changes before they are signed. The second mechanism is to give
individual directors and officers who were implicated in settlements the
right to bring an action for a declaration of innocence that could clear
them of liability. This would grant innocent directors and officers the
power to initiate legal action in order to dispel the suspicions that
surround them and preempt derivative actions against them. Our third
solution is to allow innocent directors and officers the right to sue their
colleagues who went astray and precipitated a cascade of harms on the
corporation and its employees. Our fourth, and final, proposal is to let
directors and officers bring suits against the corporations for which
they worked and seek compensation from them for harm unjustly
incurred as a consequence of DPAs and plea agreements.
A. A Right to a Hearing
One way to address the reverse agency problem is by providing
interested corporate directors and officers the right to demand a
hearing prior to the signing of a settlement. The hearing would be held
by the relevant law enforcement agency at the end of the investigation
after a detailed draft had been produced but before the settlement is
finalized. The reason for holding the hearing at this time is to give
directors and officers an opportunity to review the statements made
about them, consider their accuracy, and propose amendments to the
draft. Even small changes in the language of the settlement agreement
may have a significant impact on the future of the directors and officers
involved.184
The hearing will give those implicated in the settlement agreement
an opportunity to set the record straight by correcting potential

184. To illustrate, there is a huge difference between whether a DPA describes a felony as
committed by “employees” or by “certain low level employees”; similarly, there is a huge
difference if a DPA states that the admission of the company is being made under the respondeat
superior doctrine; finally, there is a huge difference between a DPA that states that the company
and its officers “knowingly” and “willfully” committed the offense and a DPA that lacks such
descriptions.
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misstatements about them and other factual errors. It appears to be the
simplest and most cost-effective solution to the reverse agency
problem. True, introducing hearings will prolong investigations and
increase their cost. Yet reducing costs and shortening investigations are
not goals in their own right; rather, they are important side constraints.
The main goal is to improve accuracy in fact-finding and to further
justice by giving directors and officers a final chance to exonerate
themselves of wrongdoing. As long as their additional cost is not
unreasonably high, such hearings may be in society’s best interest.
This solution, while promising on its face, has an obvious
downside. Its effectiveness critically depends on the willingness of the
enforcement agencies to receive input from individual directors and
officers and to change their recommendations accordingly. In other
words, the success of hearings depends on the good faith and openness
of the relevant administrative agencies.
But it is questionable that law enforcement agents would adopt
the requisite mindset to make the hearings work. Such hearings would
come at the end of a long investigation involving interviews with all the
relevant parties and careful legal analysis that yielded certain findings.
At this point, the law enforcement agencies will be focused on the large
penalty that is about to be collected from the firm. Also, they may be
facing pressures from the firm to bring the investigation to an end.
Finally, inertia, a common phenomenon in administrative agencies,185
may limit the effectiveness of the proposed hearing.
If law enforcement agencies cannot hold these hearings with an
open mind and an open heart, they will be counterproductive. Not only
will the hearings be costly, but also in their aftermath, it will be nearly
impossible for individual directors and officers to prove their
innocence. After all, they were granted an opportunity to vindicate
themselves and failed.
One possible solution is to appoint a relatively neutral body to
hold the hearing. Put differently, separating the body holding the
hearing from the body leading the investigation may lead to a more
meaningful opportunity for officers and directors to clear themselves

185. Justice Stephen Breyer reasons that
it will not be difficult for agencies to reach a decision and then to write whatever impact
statement is needed to justify it. The temptation for the agency to do so will be great,
because its staff, through inertia, will tend to favor existing regulatory directions. And
in many agencies it is common practice first to reach a decision and then to have a
special opinion-writing section compose a statement in justification.
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 365 (2009).
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of guilt. Two paths could potentially achieve this purpose: first, the
hearing could be managed by the prosecutors’ supervisors, namely
their U.S. attorney or the deputy attorney general for the criminal
division of the DOJ; second, a court could hold the hearing and the
judge could exclude any misstatements. Unfortunately, both paths face
severe practicality issues in the status quo.
The first path resembles the DOJ’s effort in increasing procedural
safeguards for corporate defendants in the aspect of attorney–client
privilege waivers. Amid widespread criticism for its practice of seeking
attorney–client privilege waivers from companies that hope to secure
a DPA, the DOJ published the McNulty Memorandum in December
2006. 186 The Memo states that before requesting that a corporation
waive its attorney–client privilege, “prosecutors must first obtain
written authorization from their United States Attorney who, prior to
authorizing the request, must provide a copy of the request to, and
consult with, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division.” 187 Despite such efforts, commentators argue that the new
procedural framework “is quite unlikely to reverse the tide of eroding
rights and privileges”188 for two principal reasons. First, the McNulty
Memo, like any other memo published by the DOJ, only provides
nonbinding guidelines. Absent judicial oversight over the PDAnegotiation process, and considering that the practice of asking for
privilege waivers is already entrenched in the prosecution process,189
the DOJ is not likely to strictly follow the new framework. In fact, there
is evidence showing that the DOJ has failed to implement the
framework at all.190

186. Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Cooperation During Investigations and
Audits, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 12–13 (2007).
187. Id. at 46; see also Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., to Heads of Dep’t Components U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations 9 (Dec. 12, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/
mcnulty_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/58RV-7P99] (describing the process for obtaining an
attorney–client privilege waiver for Category I information).
188. Mark & Pearson, supra note 186, at 69.
189. Given that no charge is filed in the case of NPAs, courts are not involved and do not have
the power to review the agreements. As for DPAs, both the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
have held that “absent ‘clear evidence’ of prosecutorial misconduct, the district court’s
supervisory power did not authorize substantive review of a DPA’s terms.” Nick Werle,
Prosecuting Corporate Crime when Firms Are Too Big To Jail: Investigation, Deterrence, and
Judicial Review, 128 YALE L.J. 1366, 1409 (2019).
190. Mark & Pearson, supra note 186, at 70.
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Second, the new review process itself may be no more than a
rubber stamp:
U.S. attorneys are unlikely to deny such requests—indeed, they are
often pressing their assistants aggressively to seek such materials—
[and] it is hard to imagine the “review” process at the assistant
attorney general level will be anything but perfunctory. I have talked
with former high-ranking department officials who share that view. I
would expect the review process to be no more rigorous than the
review and approval by the assistant attorney general of requests by
line prosecutors to provide statutory immunity to witnesses. Such
requests are routinely rubber-stamped. Indeed, approval by the
assistant attorney general is not even required for Category I requests
made by assistant U.S. attorneys—only “consultation” is
mandated.191

Moreover, the successor to the McNulty Memo, the Filip Memo,
took away the procedural requirement.192 The DOJ may argue that it
removed the requirement because the Filip Memo mandates that
prosecutors base their charging decisions on “relevant facts” rather
than privilege waivers. But commentators argue that this new form of
cooperation still needs procedural protections governing privilege
waivers because it “may create an underground system of waiver and
coercion.”193 The failed attempt to rely on internal procedural reforms
to remedy issues in negotiating PDAs caused by wide prosecutorial
discretion and unequal bargaining power between prosecutors and
corporations is illustrative. The reverse agency problem, as we
discussed before, raises similar concerns. Thus, entrusting the DOJ
with the responsibility to solve the problem by holding an internal
hearing is unrealistic, at least for now, no matter whether the party
conducting the hearing is nominally independent of the prosecutors or
not.
At the end of the day, hearings should be adopted as a solution to
the reverse agency problem only if lawmakers are convinced that the
enforcement agents that administer them are open to persuasion.

191. N. Richard Janis, The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing, WASH. LAW.,
Feb. 2007, at 35, 38.
192. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 127, § 9-28.720 (describing the cooperation-credit
analysis).
193. Peter Reilly, Negotiating Bribery: Toward Increased Transparency, Consistency, and
Fairness in Pretrial Bargaining Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
347, 374 (2014).
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B. Declaration of Innocence
The second solution to the reverse agency problem relies
exclusively on the courts. It harnesses the judicial system to help
directors and officers. Specifically, directors and officers who were
implicated in investigations and settlements should have a cause of
action to seek a declaration of innocence against the corporation in
court to clear their names of wrongdoing. A declaration of innocence
that clears individual agents of wrongdoing would dispel the
uncertainty that hovers over them, prevent the automatic filing of
derivative actions against them, and allow them to restore their
reputation194 and carry on with their careers.
Moreover, if the action for a declaration of innocence is successful,
directors and officers should be able to receive indemnification from
their companies for the legal fees and judicial costs they incurred. This,
in turn, would incentivize companies not to agree to a broad attribution
of culpability given that doing so might attract a significant number of
suits for declarations of innocence. Furthermore, successful claims
would make it harder for firms to attract future talent; employees may
rightfully hesitate to join firms that are willing to extricate themselves
from an investigation by sacrificing their employees.
The declaration of innocence should be distinguished from the
traditional declaratory judgment. Although securing a declaratory
judgment against the company before it settles with the government
would protect directors and officers from reputational or emotional
harm,195 it is unlikely that the directors and officers would be able to
overcome the procedural obstacles necessary to obtain a declaratory
judgment.
To secure a declaratory judgment, corporate agents must satisfy
the actual controversy requirement, and the relevant test is “whether
the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests,
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
194. Note in this regard that the Supreme Court has suggested a constitutional right to protect
one’s reputation. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The
right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—
a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”).
195. A declaratory judgment indicating the innocence of the directors and officers in relation
to the corporate crime committed would preempt the companies from using inappropriately
broad statements of facts to secure a PDA.

PARCHOMOVSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE AGENT’S PROBLEM

3/25/2021 8:18 PM

1563

declaratory judgment.” 196 A declaratory judgment is a remedy for
injury in fact,197 not “an opinion advising what the law would be upon
a hypothetical state of facts.”198 Because former directors and officers
of the suspect company are excluded from any settlement negotiations,
it would be difficult for them to prove real and imminent threat by
showing that their company will exaggerate their role in the crime
committed in exchange for a PDA and that the misstatements will
create reputational and emotional damages. Asking the court to rule
on misstatements that may appear in the future is asking it to issue an
opinion based on hypothetical facts.
A solution to this problem is to create a new statutory right and
remedy called a declaration of innocence that allows for a judicial
determination that the plaintiff did not cause the harm alleged in the
settlement agreement, and give corporate agents a cause of action to
sue the company for it after the company has settled with the
government. Some commentators have proposed a similar solution to
address the reputational harm resulting from a wrongful conviction.199
A plaintiff would not face the same hurdle of satisfying the actual
controversy requirement because the controversy has already
occurred. Another benefit of establishing a new statutory right is that
it could be designed to minimize the plaintiff’s procedural burden. For
instance, Professor Frederick Lawrence has advocated for a “no-fault,
no damages suit” in which “the plaintiff’s case is narrowly focused on
the falseness of the accusation or conviction” and the plaintiff does not
have to prove fault on the part of the defendant.200
Giving directors and officers the right to sue for a declaration of
innocence has several advantages over the option of granting them a
right to a hearing with an enforcement agency. Judges, unlike law
enforcement agents, are impartial, independent, and immune from
market pressures. Judges are much more likely to consider the claims
of directors and officers without prejudice and grant them declaratory
relief, when appropriate. Judges, of course, have no personal stake in
the outcome of the case and will be guided by their sense of justice.
196. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
197. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).
198. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 127.
199. See, e.g., Frederick Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgements To
Vindicate the Wrongly Convicted, 18 PUB. INT. L.J. 391, 397 (2009) (“As a remedy to the stigma
suffered by persons wrongfully accused or convicted of criminal acts, this Article proposes that
persons wrongfully accused of criminal acts have a right to sue for a declaration of innocence.”).
200. Id. at 399–400.
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In sum, individual employees, directors, and officers cannot
challenge the content of the settlements their corporations enter, or
correct the statements made about them in those settlements. Leaving
them to live with the negative implications of settlements, to which
they were not a party and which they could not meaningfully influence,
is a highly unjust result. Individual directors and officers should not be
barred from suing because of the procedural burden imposed by the
traditional declaratory judgment. Under these circumstances,
Congress should lend them a helping hand and allow them to initiate
legal action to clear themselves. We therefore call on Congress to
create a new statutory right and remedy—the declaration of
innocence—that allows directors and officers to exonerate themselves
from allegations of wrongdoing.
C. An Action Against Other Directors and Officers
A third solution to the reverse agency problem is to give innocent
directors and officers legal recourse against their colleagues who broke
the law and brought about the criminal investigation. After all, criminal
investigations are commenced for a reason, and corporate admissions
of guilt are not groundless. In a typical case, the acts or omissions of
the guilty employees trigger the criminal investigation that will result
in the attribution of illicit behavior to their colleagues, who have done
no wrong. Under this proposal, directors and corporate officers who
suffered losses as a consequence of the decisions or behaviors of their
peers would be allowed to sue their peers to recover compensation for
their losses.
Importantly, this proposal would not allow suits against the
corporation itself, but only against individual directors and officers
who strayed from the path. Neither the corporation nor its
shareholders would be affected by such suits. But implementing this
proposal requires the law to recognize a new fiduciary duty that will
apply among directors and officers inter se. Under current law,
directors and officers owe a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to their
corporations but not to one another.201 At present, therefore, fiduciary
duties apply only vertically—that is, in the relationship between
corporations and their top agents.

201. Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in
Corporate Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 803, 803 (2019).
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Elsewhere, we have argued that the modern business world has
become so complex and specialized that directors and corporate
officers have become dependent on one another. 202 Each of them
brings a unique set of skills and backgrounds to the table. No individual
director or officer can be expected to perform on her own all the tasks
necessary for the successful functioning of the corporation. Hence,
directors and managers have no choice but to rely on each other.
Failure by one board member or manager can doom the entire board
or management team. For example, one director’s behavior may have
been the main factor that led to a derivative action and a subsequent
judgment for breach of fiduciary duty against the board. But in many
circumstances, courts will only assign collective liability to the board,
instead of individual liability to each board member. 203 Even if the
board won the lawsuit, treating it as a whole without recognizing a
horizontal fiduciary duty may impose equally serious reputational
harms on all the directors.204 Such a corporate-law regime is unfair and
harms corporate governance. 205 For this reason, we have suggested
recognizing a new fiduciary duty that would apply horizontally among
directors and officers in their working relationships.206 A breach of the
duty by a director or officer will enable other directors and officers who
were harmed by the breach to seek damages from the delinquent actor.
Allowing directors and officers to seek compensation from peers
who harmed them would provide a way to recover for the losses that
befell them. Unlike an administrative hearing or a declaratory
judgment that does not address past harms, a suit for a breach of a
horizontal fiduciary duty, if successful, would make the plaintiff whole.
Furthermore, the introduction of monetary damages would allow
courts to apportion liability among defendants or reduce compensation
awards in cases in which plaintiffs are found contributorily negligent.
In other words, the use of monetary damages would allow courts to go
beyond all-or-nothing solutions.

202. Id. at 852–53 (“The rise of criminal and administrative enforcement campaigns against
corporations has increased the level of interdependence among corporate officers and
directors.”).
203. Id. at 816–17.
204. Id. at 820–21.
205. Id. at 809–11.
206. Id.
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D. A Lawsuit Against the Company?
A fourth possible solution to the reverse agency problem is to give
directors and corporate officers a cause of action against the
corporation for damages for unnecessarily implicating them in
wrongdoing.207 On its face, this solution is similar to giving directors
and officers a cause of action to sue for a declaration of innocence. And
it appears to be a straightforward response to the reverse agency
problem. After all, it is the company that chose to enter into the
agreement and chose not to go to the trouble of carefully distinguishing
between culpable executives and innocent ones. On closer
examination, the matter is not nearly as simple as it may appear and
may lead to the problem of split loyalties.
As explained throughout this Article, the decision to enter into an
agreement with the enforcement authorities, and do so expeditiously,
is in the best interest of the company. Furthermore, the board, in
deciding to negotiate and approve a settlement, acts within its fiduciary
duty to the company. At present, it owes no fiduciary duty to past
executives and directors, or even to the serving ones. Neither does the
company owe any obligation to protect them.208 To allow executives to
sue the firm would require creating a new legal duty, though not
necessarily a fiduciary duty, that prohibits the company from
negligently or recklessly making false statements that its directors and
officers are culpable. It is, of course, possible to recognize such a duty.
But unlike recognizing the horizontal fiduciary duty, doing so will
engender a problem of split loyalties. Presently, at least under the
predominant view, corporate agents have a single goal—maximizing
shareholders’ profits. Imposing additional duties on corporate officers
and directors puts them in very difficult situations, requiring them to
favor one group of stakeholders over another.
Furthermore, in the case of settlements, companies do not have
much leeway. They face a take-it-or-leave-it situation. It is the
enforcement authorities who are in the driver’s seat. Companies do not
have any real bargaining power. Therefore, allowing individual
executives to file suits against their company under these circumstances
is an extreme measure that this Article does not support, at least in
ordinary cases. Law enforcement authorities should be able to do their
jobs undeterred. This kind of lawsuit should be allowed, if at all, only

207. We are grateful to Professor Zohar Goshen for pointing out this possibility to us.
208. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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in extreme cases—those in which companies were reckless or grossly
negligent.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that the agency problem in corporate
law is not unidirectional, as conventional theory suggests, but rather is
bidirectional. For almost a century, a central tenet of corporate-law
scholarship and policy has been that corporate officers and directors
are predisposed to sacrifice the interests of their companies and
shareholders to promote their own narrow self-interest. The reverse
phenomenon also exists. Companies facing criminal and regulatory
investigations are willing to sacrifice their top officials, indeed all of
their employees, in order to appease government authorities and strike
a favorable settlement with them. Like its more famous kin, the reverse
agency problem arises from a perfectly rational motivation in the
compliance age—namely, firms’ desire to avoid criminal indictment
and bring criminal investigation to a rapid close. That to achieve this
goal firms are willing to attribute wrongdoing to large groups of
directors and managers, without distinguishing among guilty and
innocent individuals, is consistent with the wealth-maximization goal
of the firm and its shareholders.
In addition to unveiling the reverse agency problem and analyzing
its causes and effects, this Article proposed four possible solutions to
it. First, directors and officers should be afforded special hearings that
would give them an opportunity to set the record straight prior to the
finalization of settlements. Second, directors and officers should have
the right to seek a declaration of innocence clearing them of
wrongdoing. Third, corporate officers who suffered reputational harms
on account of wrongful actions or omissions by their peers should have
a cause of action to seek recourse from the latter by bringing civil
actions against them. And finally, in extreme cases, it may be
appropriate to allow innocent corporate directors and officers to seek
monetary compensation from their corporate employers for the harms
they suffered as a result of settlement agreements that were entered
into with gross negligence or reckless disregard of their rights.
By bringing to light the reverse agency problem, this Article
depicts a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the complex
interaction between firms and their officers. In the age of compliance,
the agent’s problem is as central to corporate law as the agency
problem.

